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INTRODUCTION 
More than a decade ago CEPAL, in co-operation with IPEA, 
sponsored a pioneering study of the relationship between market 
structure and exports of manufactures in Brazil (Fajnzylber 
1971). The study found that in 1968 over half of the industrial 
exports of Brazil were from industries with relatively low levels 
of concentration, i.e. from industries with large numbers of 
small and medium-sized firms. Data for a sample of 283 firms 
whi.rh exported in 1967 suggested that export performance was a 
decreasing function of firm size, and (except for foreign-owned 
firms) an increasing function of capital intensity (Fajnzylber, 
a n n o n r i i v 7 ) _ — r- i . — / * « 
Since the late 1960s, Brazil's exports of manufactured goods 
have undergone impressive growth and diversification. For this 
reason it has been possible to assemble a large data base which 
has allowed us, with the aid of statistical techniques of 
analysis, to reach quite definite conclusions concerning the 
effect of market structure and economic policies on export 
performance. The data were assembled from the returns of direct 
and indirect taxes that industrial corporations filed with the 
Brazilian government in 1978 and 1979. Nonetheless, no 
individual company is identified in the data base, and particular 
care has been taken to insure the confidentiality of data for 
individual firms. 
The plan of the report is as follows. The first chapter 
consists of a non-technical summary of the main empirical 
findings along with a discussion of their policy implications. 
It is intended as a concise, self-contained report that is 
accessible to the general reader. Details are provided in the 
remaining chapters. Chapter II discusses various hypotheses to 
be tested that are drawn from the literature of international 
trade and industrial economics. Chapter III provides a 
description of the data base along with some nonparametric tests 
of the relationship between firm size and exports, and between 
firm size and export subsidies. The last two chapters contain 
the main econometric analyses: chapter IV specifies and estimates 
a logit model of the determinants of the probability of exporting 
while chapter V utilizes ordinary least squares techniques to 
find the determinants of inter-firm differences in the 
performance of exporters. 
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iUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this study is to determine first what factors 
distinguish exporters from nonexporters and, secondly, what 
factors influence the performance of firms once they enter export 
markets. To accomplish this task, a vast micro data base has 
been assembled. It contains data for the fiscal year 1978 for 
12 435 firms, 3 345 of which registered at least some exports. 
Only 21 firms (eight exporters) are public enterprises. 
Nonresident ownership of equity exceeds ten percent in 841 firms 
(610 exporters). These subsidiaries of transnational enterprises 
and joint ventures of foreign with local capital account for 
33.0% of the domestic sales and 38.8% of the total exports of 
firms in our sample. An additional 245 firms <148 exporters) 
have license agreements with overseas firms which allow them 
access to foreign technology and trademarks. 
1. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
Firm size is without doubt the most important factor 
affecting both the probability that a firm will export and its 
subsequent export performance. To export even the smallest 
volume of output requires incurrence of the costs involved in 
dealing with government bureaucracies, obtaining market 
information, and setting up overseas sales organizations. 
Because of the existence of these fixed costs of exporting, 
larger firms are more likely to export than are small firms. 
However, among firms that do export, those with a small domestic 
market exhibit the largest ratio of exports to sales, for they 
have the most to gain from scale economies (cost reductions) 
through exports. 
Both observed relationships — the positive effect of firm 
size on the probability of exporting and the negative effect of 
size on subsequent export performance — persist when the effect 
of other relevant variables are accounted for. Moreover this is 
true not for isolated industries, but rather for industries 
throughout Brazil's manufacturing sector. On average, each one 
percent increase in the total sales of a firm is associated with 
a 0.8 to 0.9 percent increase in the odds of exporting. Among 
exporters, each increase of one percent in domestic sales 
results, on average, in a decrease of 0.8 to 0.9 percent in the 
ratio of exports to domestic sales. 
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These findings regarding firm size imply that increased 
concentrâti on of domestic sales in large enterprises has a 
negative effect on exports first because small firms may fail to 
reach the critical size required for exports and secondly because 
larger firms export a smaller proportion Df their output. These 
indirect effects are quite strong and are offset only partially 
by positive direct effects of concentration on export 
performance: other things equal, very small exporters and very 
large enterprises export more if they are located in concentrated 
industries than if they are in relatively unconcentrated 
industries. Nonetheless, for the vast majority of firms — over 
70% of the firms in our sample — increased concentrâti on has no 
positive effect whatsoever on exports, whereas it does have a 
substantial, though indirect, negative effect through changes in 
the size distribution of firms in an industry. 
Exporters use more physical plant and equipment per unit of 
output and a more skilled labor force than nonexporters. The 
statistical analysis of this report shows clearly, however, that 
this is the product of two separate relationships: i) large 
firms are skill- and capital-intensive compared to small firms, 
and ii) exporters happen also to be relatively large compared to 
nonexporters. Controlling for differences in firm size and other 
variables, increases in capital intensity and average skill 
levels decrease the probability that a firm will export. This 
result is consistent with the predictions of the conventional 
theory of international trade for a country like Brazil which is 
well endowed with unskilled labor, but lacks abundant capital and 
skilled labor. 
Among firms that export, physical capital intensity <but not 
human skills) has a positive impact on export performance once 
account is taken of variations' in domestic sales and other 
relevant variables. In other words, the greater the requirements 
of physical plant and equipment per unit of output, the greater, 
on average, is the volume of exports. This finding is opposite 
that which might be predicted by standard trade theory, but it is 
consistent with considerations of economies of scale in 
production. Investment in plant and equipment tends to be 
indivisible or "lumpy," so a firm using capital-intensive 
techniques of production requires a large market to reduce 
average costs to a minimum. For two firms with equal domestic 
sales but differing techniques of production, the one with a 
large investment in capital has a need to spread capital costs 
over a larger volume of exports than does the firm that utilizes 
more labor and fewer or less sophisticated machines. 
Advertising expenditures show a very strong and positive 
relationship with both the probability of exporting and export 
performance. Markets in which advertising is important are 
"monopolistically competitive," i.e. the products sold are not 
standardized and firms compete with advertising and a 
proliferation of brand names. When local producers are protected 
from import competition, high prices and high profits encourage 
new entrants to set up production facilities, so such markets 
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tend also to have large numbers of plants of suboptimal size. 
Firms operating in protected, but monopolistical1y competitive 
markets thus have a strong incentive to export at prices below 
those prevailing in the local market in order to obtain economies 
of scale and a reduction in costs per unit of output. 
State ownership appears to have a negative effect on the 
probability of exporting and a positive effect on export/sales 
ratios once this ratio is greater than zero. It is difficult to 
ascribe much importance to this result, however, since few firms 
in the sample are public enterprises. 
In contrast, license agreements have a significant and 
positive effect on both the probability of exporting and the 
performance of exporters. It is sometimes thought that owners of 
technology and trademarks impose severe restrictions on 
licensees, hindering exports of such firms. For the firms in our 
data base, however, the existence of license agreements with 
overseas firms implies, on average, an increase of up to 100% in 
the odds that a firm will export, and an increase of 100 to 150% 
in subsequent exports. Licensed technology and brand names thus 
appear to be a prerequisite for, rather than an obstacle to, 
export success in Brazil. 
Foreign ownership of equity is also associated with a larger 
number of exporters and a larger volume of exports even after 
controlling for the effect of other relevant variables such as 
industry, size and capital intensity. Subsidiaries of 
transnatianal t»nterprises or joint ventures of foreign and local 
capital exhibit 140 to 270% greater odds of exporting, and 80 to 
130% higher exports compared to comparable firms which do not 
have access to foreign technology and trademarks through 
ownership links or licenses. This result reflects the fact that 
the cost of exporting is lower for transnational firms, which 
have a good knowledge of foreign market conditions and often have 
the necessary sales organizations already in place in overseas 
markets. 
Tariffs and other import barriers increase the cruzeiro 
price of import substitutes relative to exports, encouraging 
firms to produce for local rather than export markets. For each 
percentage point increase in the ratio of domestic to import 
prices, the volume of exports falls by an estimated three-
quarters of a percentage point. For some firms, this anti-export 
bias is offset by export subsidies that increase the amount of 
cruzeiros received for each dollar of export revenue. In 
addition, export performance is improved when exporters have 
access to a supply of inputs at international prices through the 
drawback provision for duty-free imports. 
Export subsidies are widely used in Brazil to stimulate 
exports of manufactures, but the analysis of this report shows 
clearly that the system of subsidies discriminates against small 
exporters. In general, the smaller the exporter, the smaller the 
rate of subsidy. This is true for aggregate manufacturing and 
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•for individual industries throughout the manufacturing sector. 
Most surprisingly, a total of 523 exporters — 15.6% of the 
sample — received no fiscal subsidy at all in 1978. 
Unsubsidized exporters are found in a wide variety of industries, 
and tend to be much smaller than subsidized exporters. This 
suggests that the cost of bureaucratic transactions may well 
exceed the benefit of any subsidy to which a small exporter is 
entitled. 
2. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Many policy implications follow directly from the empirical 
findings summarized above. Others require some elaboration. 
Those discussed in this section are intended to be illustrative 
but not comprehensive. 
An important finding of the present study is the 
confirmation of a very strong and independent relationship 
between firm size and the probability of exporting in Brazil. 
Other things equal, the smaller the firm, the less likely it is 
to export a portion of its output. Given fixed costs of entering 
export markets, such a relationship is inevitable. Nonetheless, 
the strength of the impact of size on the probability of 
exporting is strongly influenced by government policy. The 
estimated effect of firm size on the probability of exporting is 
not a purely technical parameter, but rather a number that 
reflects the effects of government policies; it can be altered 
by changes in those policies. Small firms tend to operate with a 
1 ess skilled 1abor force and with less capital-intensive methods 
of production than do large firms, so the fact that the impact of 
capital intensity on the probability of exporting is negative 
means that policies to promote the entry of small firms into 
export markets can be particularly effective. 
The system of export subsidies in effect in Brazil, or at 
least that in effect in 1978, discrimi nates against the small 
exporter, and this no doubt discourages small firms from 
exporting in the first instance. More importantly, however, the 
bureaucracy in general operates so as to increase markedly the 
fixed costs of exporting. To quote a recent World Bank report: 
The general attitude of the administration (particular-
ly of CACEX Cthe Foreign Trade Department of the Banco 
do Brasil]) toward exporting enterprises seems often to 
have been one of suspicion, instead of assistance and 
promotion. The volume of export documentation required 
is enormous, and CACEX operates a detailed export 
control system. This requires for both the exporting 
enterprises and CACEX large and costly bureaucracies, 
which may be an important reason for the concentration 
of exports in a comparatively limited number of large 
enterprises with experienced export administrations. 
(World Bank 1983, p. 31.) 
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The Brazilian government appears to be -fully aware of the fact 
that bureaucratic controls inhibit the exports of small firms. 
Even the director of CACEX, Mr Carlos Viacava, has publicly 
criticized the "excessive centralization" Cexcessivo centralismoJ 
of government which "hinders efforts of small and medium-sized 
firms to expand their exports." [...que impede uma maior 
agressividade da pequena e media empresa para aumentar suas 
exportacoes] (Jornal de Brasilia, 17 February, 1984, p. 1.) To 
date, however, little has been done to change this situation. 
k The formation of trading companies or export consortia is a 
potentially effective way to distribute the fixed costs of 
exporting among a number of firms. Such organizations are 
•v particulary useful for small firms when fixed costs include the 
cost of dealing with a centralized bureaucracy, but neither type 
of organization is common in Brazil. In a supposed effort to 
encourage exports by small firms, the Central Bank in April 1984 
passed Resolution No. 906 which reduces the minimum capital 
required for the formation of export consortia composed solely of 
small firms from 114 000 ORTN (indexed government bonds), or 
approximately US $ 912 000, to 11 000 ORTN, or approximately US 
$ 88 000. Unfortunately, however, this measure will have no 
impact whatsoever on new entrants into export markets, or even 
new entrants into export consortia, for all participants in a 
consortium formed under Resolution 906 must previously be members 
of an established consortium which has been in existence either 
for two years with a minimum of two million dollars in exports or 
for three years with a minimum of one mi 1ion dollars in exports. 
A second empirical finding which is of great importance from 
the point of view of potential changes in economic policy is the 
fact that there is a very strong inverse relationship between 
firm size and export performance that is independent of other 
economic variables. This finding has two fundamental policy 
implications. First, any program to encourage the entry of small 
* and medium-sized firms into export markets will have the added 
benefit of increasing the average export/sales ratio's of 
Brazilian exporters. Secondly, policies which decrease 
* industrial concentration in domestic markets will result in 
improved export performance because the average size of firms, as 
measured by domestic sales, will decrease. This positive impact 
of decreased concentrâti.on on exports is offset only partially by 
a negative effect for very large and very small firms. 
The statistical analysis of this study demonstrates clearly 
that commercial policy has a significant and direct impact on 
export performance in Brazil. Import protection allows domestic 
prices and costs to exceed those of foreign producers and makes 
export markets appear unattractive to Brazilian producers. This 
bias against exports can be offset by export subsidies, drawback 
for import duties on imported inputs, and by real devaluation of 
the cruzeiro. Export subsidies as administered in Brazil appear 
to discriminate against the small firm, and duty drawback is most 
effective as an export stimulus for firms with little industrial 
value-added and a high dependence on imported inputs. Real 
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devaluation, in contrast, stimulates exports from all firms 
irrespective of size or dependence on imports. The exchange rate 
is thus potentially a very effective instrument of export 
promotion in Brazil. It has the added advantage of not provoking 
the imposition of countervailing duties in importing countries. 
In an inflationary economy such as that of Brazil, real 
devaluation reguires increases in the cruzeiro price of dollars 
to equal or exceed increases in the general price level. 
Access to foreign technology and trademarks is clearly 
beneficial to the performance of exporters in Brazil's 
manufacturing sector. The findings of this paper suggest, 
however, that it makes no difference on average whether this 
access is provided by licensing agreements or by the sale of 
equity to transnational enterprises. Subsidiaries of 
transnational enterprises and joint ventures of foreign and local 
capital do, however, face markedly lower fixed costs of 
exporting; for this reason, they are more likely to export in the 
first instance than are comparable firms that lack these direct 
links to foreign markets. 
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II. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
This chapter discusses the main predictions of the theory of 
international trade and industrial economics concerning both 
inter-firm and inter-industry'differences in the probability of 
exporting and in export performance. Where relevant, the 
empirical findings of earlier studies are also mentioned. For 
ease of exposition, in this chapter and throughout the report, 
export performance refers solely to the export/sales ratios of 
exporters, i.e. to firms who have already entered export markets. 
It will be shown that the determinants of export performance are 
somewhat different from the determinants of the probability of 
exporting in the first instance. 
1. SCALE ECONOMIES 
Given that there are fixed costs of entering export markets, 
it follows that the larger the firm, the greater the probability 
of exporting, for these fixed costs can be spread over a larger 
volume of sales. Fixed costs include the costs of dealing with 
government bureaucracies in the exporting and importing country, 
of obtaining market information and of setting up a sales 
organization abroad. Moreover, importers often have no interest 
iri small or irregular shipments, so a minimum size may be 
necessary if any exports are to be supplied at all. (See Tyler 
1976, pp. 254-260 and Rapp 1976.) 
Once a firm incurs the fixed cost of entering foreign 
markets, one can expect a negative relationship between export 
performance and the size of firm, where size is measured in terms 
of domestic sales. If exporting is motivated by a desire to 
achieve economies of scale, then firms with large domestic sales 
are likely to export a smaller proportion of their output, for 
they can obtain the benefits of large-scale production without 
incurring the extra costs associated with exporting (Glejser et 
al. 1980). For the same reason, firms with a large number of 
establishments should export more than would a single-plant firm 
with a similar volume of domestic sales. 
Auquier (1980, pp. 205-207) notes correctly that there is an 
alternative explanation for an inverse relationship between firm 
size and export performance: Such correlation could result from 
product differentiation and demand factors as well as scale 
economies ger se. If small firms produce varieties (specialty 
goods) that do not have mass appeal, or if small firms in an 
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industry face more elastic domestic demand curves than their 
larger rivals, then it follows that among firms that export, the 
proportion of output exported will be larger for the small firms. 
In an empirical test employing data for individual firms the only 
way to distinguish this explanation from the scale economies 
hypothesis is that the latter predicts a positive partial 
correlation between the number of plants and export performance 
whereas the former would not predict, holding firm size constant, 
any correlation whatsoever between plant size and exports. 
Nevertheless, the two hypotheses are not mutually exclusive and 
it is possible for both simultaneously to account for greater 
export performance on the part of small firms. 
Evidence for a negative relationship between firm size and 
export/sales ratios has been found for Belgium (Glejser et al. 
1980), France (Auquier 1980), the United Kingdom (Utton 1982), 
Japan <Rapp 1976) and Brazil (Fajnzylber 1971, appendix 7, Silber 
1978). Hirsch and Adar (1974) report a positive correlation 
between firm size and export performance for a sample of firms 
from TXenmark, Holland and Israel, but the study has two defects: 
i) size was defined as total sales rather than domestic sales, 
and ii) it is not clear whether firms with no exports were 
excluded from the sample. In all of these studies, with the 
exception of Blejser et al., there has been insufficient control 
for variations in other relevant variables such as type of 
product, capital intensity, export subsidies and type of 
ownershi p. 
2. CAFITAL INTENSITY 
Standard (Heckscher-Ohlin) trade theory predicts a negative 
relationship between capital intensity, whether human or 
physical, and exports in a capital-poor, labor-rich country like 
Brazil. ~ There does exist considerable aggregate evidence for 
Brazil in support of this hypothesis. Despite the distortions of 
subsidized credit, import protection and export subsidies, 
Brazil's imports embody, on average, more skills and physical 
capital than do Brazil's exports. This finding, which is based 
on direct and indirect requirements in production, is true for 
both total trade and for trade in manufactures (Tyler 1976, ch. 
6, Carvalho and Haddad 1981, Rocca and Mendonca 1972, Hidalgo 
1983). Tyler (1970) found, on the basis of direct requirements 
only, that exports of manufactures in 1965 were more capital-
intensive than manufacturing production in general; but Carvalho 
and Haddad (1981, p. 53) show that the labor intensity of 
industrial exports increased markedly in the 1967-1974 period, so 
Tyler's conclusions may not be applicable to later years. 
Conventional trade theory may be useful in predicting 
whether or not a firm will export in the first instance. Once 
the export decision has been made, however, trade theory may be 
of little help in explaining the proportion of output that is 
exported by a particular firm. An alternative hypothesis 
relating capital intensity to export performance can be derived 
from industrial economics. If scale economies are a decisive 
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factor in the allocation of output between foreign and domestic 
markets, one would expect this factor to be more, important, 
ceteris paribus, the more capital-intensive the tecniques of 
production employed by the firm. Investment in physical plant 
and equipment tends to be indivisible or "lumpy," hence a firm 
operating with capital-intensive techniques will tend to require 
a larger market to reduce average costs to a minimum. In other 
words, holding the size of the domestic market constant, physical 
capital intensity should have a positive effect on export 
performance. Skilled labor tends to be quite divisible compared 
to physical equipment, so no particular effect is predicted for 
human capital intensity. 
3. ADVERTISING AND PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION 
For advertising, like capital intensity, there are two 
plausible hypotheses. The Dreze (I960) hypothesis predicts a 
negative relationship between advertising and exports because 
countries like Brazil which are minor participants in 
international trade are not "taste-makers," hence are expected to 
specialize in standardized manufactures which compete primarily 
on the basis of price. On the other hand, advertising intensity 
is associated with monopolistic competition, and monopolistic 
competition can be beneficial for exports when the domestic 
market is protected from import competition. 
Consider a protected industry which is monopolistical1y 
competitive in the sense that there are differentiated products 
but freedom of entry into, as well as exit from, the industry. 
In international markets firms are likely to be "price-takers" 
which face extremely elastic demand. In the domestic market 
consumers regard any particular firm's product as a very 
imperfect substitute for competing goods produced by other firms, 
so demand is less than perfectly elastic. Since excess profits 
attract entry, in long-run equilibrium each firm in such an 
industry will produce, in the absence of exports, at a point 
where its average cost curve is tangent to the downward sloping 
demand curve that it faces. This results in the well-known 
"excess capacity theorem" of monopolistic competition in which 
average costs exceed those which would be experienced if output 
were expanded. The greater the advertising expenditures, the more 
differentiated the product, which in turn implies a less elastic 
domestic demand and greater "excess capacity." This excess 
capacity can be profitably utilized for export markets so long as 
the marginal revenue from export sales exceeds the marginal cost 
of production. 
4. FOREIGN LICENSES 
Licensees of foreign technology and trademarks might, due to 
restrictions imposed by overseas firms, be expected to show a 
lower propensity to export than would be the case in the absence 
of license agreements. On the other hand, access to foreign 
technology and international1y known brand names might give a 
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•firm a competitive edge in -foreign markets. The effect which 
dominates can be determined only by empirical analysis, not by 
economic theory. 
5. FOREIGN OWNERSHIP 
Foreign-owned firms, because of their international 
connections, are expected, ceteris earibus, to be more likely to 
export and to have a better export performance than locally owned 
firms. Transnational firms have a greater knowledge of foreign 
market conditions than do purely local firms, and have 
organizations already in place in overseas markets. 
6. INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION 
There exists a large body of theoretical literature, 
supported by weak empirical evidence, that postulates a positive 
correlation between market power and export performance. (See 
White 1974, Das 1982, Pagoulatos and So.rensen 1976 and Marvel 
1980.) This reasoning, which is based largely on the possibility 
of profitable price discrimination (dumping) seems relevant for 
protected markets like those of Brazil. If so, one can expect, 
BâCl^us, a positive relation between concentration and 
exports for firms with large domestic market shares. Auquier 
(1980, p.211) has proposed the alternative hypothesis that 
"concentrâtion, by promoting more collusive behavior on the home 
market, should induce more small firms to export (because they 
find their competitive options on domestic sales constrained)." 
If, at the same time, large firms take advantage of the 
possibility of price discrimination, higher concentrâtion should 
result in a greater export volume for both dominant firms and the 
"competitive fringe" of small firms. The two hypotheses may thus 
be complementary rather than competing explanations of the effect 
of market structure on exports. 
Two studies have predicted an inverse relation between 
concentration and export performance. Fajnzylber (1971, p. 101) 
hypothesized that a negative effect could result in Brazil from 
"the profitability of domestic sales for firms which operate in 
highly concentrated industries. One can assume that the greater 
the profitability of domestic sales, the less the incentive for 
firms to enter the competitive international market." C...a taxa 
de rentabi1idade que podem obter no mercado interne as empresas 
que operam em setores de elevado grau de concentracao. Pode-se 
presumir que enquanto for mai or a rentabi1idade interna, menor 
sera a motivacao das empresas para arriscar—se no competitivo 
mercado internacional.D Fajnzylber seems to have had a 
"satisficing" view of monopoly power in mind, but the data 
available to him (tables 20 and 24) were not consistent with the 
hypothesis. Glejser et al. (1980, pp. 508-509) predicted a 
negative effect for concentrâtion in industries producing 
standardized commodities on the grounds that to export from from 
such industries "would involve increasing the demand elasticity 
and becoming price-takers by weakening the oligopolistic 
interdependence and facility of collusion." Their empirical 
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evidence for Belgium supports the hypothesis, but it does not 
seem to be applicable to the protected markets of Brazil. 
7. COMMERCIAL POLICY 
In markets with competing imports, export performance is a 
function of domestic prices relative to prices for export sales. 
Risk factors may impede a producer from exporting all of his 
output, even though it might b© prefiti&bl® to des bo at a giv@n 
point in time. So long as a producer is not completely 
specialized in the domestic or export markets, as is the case for 
all exporters in our sample, then increases in the domestic price 
relative to the export price will cause producers to reduce 
exports in order to sell in the more profitable domestic market. 
Over time, changes in both the exchange rate and commercial 
policy (export subsidies and import tariffs) are potentially 
important determinants of prices for exports and domestic sales, 
hence of export supply. At a point in time, the exchange rate is 
fixed, so inter-industry or inter-firm differences in export 
performance will depend soley on corresponding differences in 
commercial policy. 
Import restrictions in many Brazilian industries have 
created markets in which domestic production does not compete 
with imports. As a result, a large number of intrinsically 
tradable goods have been transformed into what Tyler (1983b) has 
called "pseudo nontradables," but which might more accurately be 
described as "pseudo nonimportables." Domestic prices for these 
goods are determined soley by Brazilian demand and supply, or by 
oligopolistic collusion, or by the cost conditions of 
monopolisti cal 1 y competitive firms. Unless the markets are 
internally competitive one would not necessarily expect a 
negative relationship between export performance and the ratio of 
domestic to export prices. In concentrated industries, high 
prices may indicate high profits rather than high costs. In 
monopolistical 1 y competitive industries, firms with decreasing 
average costs may be able to export incremental production at 
prices well below those prevailing in the protected domestic 
market. 
A large number of time-series analyses of the export supply 
of manufactures are now available for Brazil. All ignore changes 
in tariff policy, and most add changes in export subsidies to the 
real exchange rate variable. All researchers, without exception, 
have found found exports to be very responsive to changes in the 
real, subsidy inclusive, exchange rate. Braga and Markwald 
(1983, p. 723), after surveying sixteen of these studies, 
conclude that "there exists a consensus among economists today 
that unity is a 'reasonable' value for the price-elasticity of 
the export supply of manufactures." Cexiste hoje um certo 
consenso, na profissao, que tende a achar "razoavel" um valor 
unitario para a elasticidade-preco da exportacao de 
manufacturados.3 
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A BCLQCi.» o n e might expect aggregate export supply to be 
equally responsive to changes in the exchange rate and to changes 
in the rate of export subsidy. Both instruments affect in a 
similar manner the amount of local currency received by the 
exporter for each dollar of export sales. They differ in that 
the exchange rate affects all exporters equally in the absence of 
differential export taxes or multiple exchange rates, whereas 
export subsidies are most often product or firm-specific. Pinto 
(1983) separated real exchange rate changes from changes in 
export subsidies; using 1954-1974 annual data, he found virtually 
no difference between the two elasticities. Tyler (1976), with 
quarterly data for 1963-1972, somewhat surprisingly found the 
subsidy elasticity to be nearly twice as great as the exchange 
rate elasticity. He attributed this to greater producer 
confidence in government support of exports when this support is 
manifested with subsidies, and predicted an eventual convergence 
over time of the two elasticities. 
With the exception of the present report, there have been no 
studies of the export response to commercial policy at the level 
of the firm, and only one study at the industry level. Tyler 
(1983a) in a pooled cross—section and time—series regression 
model found the inter—industry variation in export growth to be 
related negatively to changes in nominal tariffs and positively 
to changes in export subsidies. Only the former variable was 
statistically significant, perhaps as a result of aggregation and 
the large inter—firm variation in rates of subsidy within each 
industry. (See chapter III of this report.) 
In the regression analysis of chapter V, a measure of the 
degree of vertical integration (value added/output) of each firm 
is included as an explanatory variable for export performance. 
This is intended to act as a proxy for the importance of the 
"drawback" provision for duty-free importation of inputs used in 
the production of exports. Information on use of the drawback 
system is not available for individual firms, but in 1978, the 
year of our sample, over 40% of manufactured exports contained at 
least some inputs imported with the drawback scheme. The dollar 
value of these duty-free imports amounted to 27% of the value of 
the corresponding exports. (See Musalem 1983.) The drawback 
privilege is undoubtedly valuable to firms that make use of it 
for, despite the limited availability of data, Musalem was able 
to find evidence of a high elasticity of substition between 
imported inputs and domestically produced inputs. The 
availability of inputs at international prices should be most 
useful to the exporting firm which purchases a substantial 
portion of its inputs from other firms in the economy, i.e. to 
the firm with a low ratio of value-added to output. For this 
reason a negative relationship is expected, ceteris garJ^bus, 
between vertical integration and export performance. 
Exporters with varying degrees of vertical integration can 
also be affected differential1y by indirect taxes, but Brazilian 
taxes appear to be neutral in this respect. Producers in Brazil 
pay a tax on industrial products known as IPI. Although the IPI 
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rate varies from product to product, it is effectively a value-
added tax. Firms receive credits for IPI that the government has 
collected on inputs purchased from other firms in the economy. 
If a product is sold in the domestic econommy, the firm pays the 
IPI rate for that good, less the IPI tax credits for purchased 
intermediate goods. As is well known, this system is neutral 
with respect to tax burden of firms with differing degrees of 
vertical integration. If a product is exported, the firm is 
exempted from the IPI but retains the IPI tax credits on any 
purchased inputs. The tax system is thus neutral as well with 
respect to exporters which differ in their degree of vertical 
integration. An exporter which purchases no inputs from the rest 
of the economy <100% vertically integrated) pays no IPI at all 
whereas an exporter which depends on outside suppliers receives a 
tax credit for IPI paid on purchased inputs. These border tax 
adjustments are not export subsidies, but rather a method of 
excluding the full value of exports from indirect taxation. 
Tyler <1976, pp. 204-209) agrees that retention of IPI tax 
credits by the exporter does not constitute an export subsidy 
"for society as a whole," but argues that it does constitute a 
subsidy for the exporter, a subsidy which is paid by the 
suppliers of intermediate inputs: 
Greater IPI tax benefits will be accrued by products 
with more stages of production and lower degrees of 
industrial verticalization. Thus, a producer adding 
very little industrial value added can stand to benefit 
substantially from the previous IPI tax credit 
mechanism when he exports. In fact it is this kind of 
firm that stands to gain the most. A large, more 
vertically integrated firm that exports does not enjoy 
commensurate fiscal benefits via the tax credit 
mechanism for IPI paid on previous stages of 
production. <p. 209) 
This is an interesting possibility, but there seems to " be a 
logical error in the argument. The "producer adding very little 
value added" receives a rebate for the IPI tax that was included 
in the price of purchased inputs. The "more vertically 
integrated firm" receives less rebate because no tax was paid on 
inputs produced within the firm. Nonetheless, if the exporters 
themselves behave as if IPI tax credits were subsidies, this 
would be another reason to expect a negative relationship between 
vertical integration and export performance. 
8. PLANT LOCATION 
Plant location can also have an independent effect on export 
performance, particularly in such a diverse country as Brazil, 
and it would be interesting to test this hypothesis. Unfortuna-
tely, the necessary data for such a test were not available. The 
data available for the present study does contain information on 
the location of the head office of each firm, but this need bear 
no relation to the location of a firm's production facilities. 
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III. DESCRIPTIVE AND NONPARAMETRIC STATISTICS 
1. THE DATA BASE 
A vast micro data base has been assembled to test the 
hypotheses discussed in the preceeding chapter. The -full set of 
data consists of 15 041 firms, of which 3 562 registered exports 
in the fiscal year 197S. To facilitate the statistical analysis, 
107 firms which recorded virtually no domestic sales were deleted 
from the sample, as were 2 282 firms <101 exporters) which showed 
negative value-added or failed to report the number of employees. 
Sixteen industries producing "non-tradables" such as rock, bricks 
and mineral water were also deleted, reducing the sample size to 
a total of 12 435, of which 3 345 export to foreign markets. 
The main data source consists of corporate income tax 
returns filed in 1979. These refer to the fiscal year 1978, 
which varies by firm and need not coincide with the calendar 
year. To improve inter-firm comparabi1ity of the information, the 
data for firms with a fiscal year ending before December 1978 
were adjusted upwards according to variations in the industrial 
wholesale price index. Since income tax returns do not contain 
employment information, these data were taken from the average 
levels of employment reported on the industrial product tax (IPI) 
forms in the calendar year 1978. Individual firms are not, of 
course, identified, and to insure confidentiality four-digit 
industries with fewer than six firms were not included in the 
data base. 
Each firm has been allocated to the industry which accounts 
for the largest proportion of its total sales. There is no way 
of knowing the extent to which a firm produces products outside 
its main industry, or the extent to which the industry 
classification by total sales truly reflects the distribution of 
sales in export markets. 
As shown in table 1, the vast majority of the firms in our 
sample are under national private ownership. Foreign ownership 
is a charateristic of 841 firms, where ownership is defined 
quite broadly as more than ten percent of total equity. An 
additional 245 firms have licensing agreements with overseas 
firms. Only 21 firms in the sample are publicly owned or "mixed" 
enterprises, a consequence of the deletion of highly concentrated 
industries from the data base. 
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As can be seen in table 2, foreign-owned firms account for 
33% of the domestic sales and nearly 39% of the exports of firms 
in our sample. The participation of transnational firms is 
particularly high in the machinery, electrical equipment, 
transport equipment, rubber, pharmaceutical and cosmetics 
subsectors. In contrast, there is little foreign direct 
investment in the wood, furniture, clothing, footwear or printing 
subsectors. In all but seven of the 21 subsectors, transnational 
participation in exports exceeds participation in domestic sales. 
Transnationals tend to account for a larger share of value-added 
than of employment in each subsector. This is understandable 
because foreign-owned firms tend to be larger than their locally 
owned counterparts, and large firms are known to use quite 
capital- and ski 11-intensive techniques of production compared to 
small firms. There is also some tendency for the transnationals* 
share of export subsidies to exceed their share of exports, but 
this may also be a result of their larger size. 
Table 1 
Distribution of the Sample by Subsector 
Number of Firms 
Forei gn Forei gn Pubi: 
Subsector Jotal Exgort Liçense _0wner_ _Fir, 
TOTAL 12 433 3 345 245 841 21 
Non-metallic minerals 391 102 10 26 
Basic iron and steel 256 108 12 21 4 
Basic non-ferrous 166 39 2 16 
Metal products 1 002 260 14 64 
Machi nery 1 047 475 53 169 
Electrical equipment 523 232 20 96 
Transport equipment 371 184 22 50 1 
Wood 528 122 4 6 
Furni ture 481 84 6 5 
Pulp and paper 806 85 2 23 
Rubber products 365 54 2 11 
Leather 594 129 2 6 
Chemi cals 581 197 19 92 2 
Pharmaceutical, cosmetics 739 86 9 67 2 
PIasti cs 418 84 9 19 
Textiles 859 377 26 56 1 
Clothing 639 104 3 8 
Footwear 272 '36 1 3 
Food and tobacco 1 715 ...32 13 53 4 
Printing 300 17 11 7 6 
Other manufactures 382 138 5 43 1 
Source: 1978 data base. 
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Table 18 
Participation of Foreign-Owned Firms in Total Employment, 




Employ- Value- Domestic Export Export Tax 
ment added Sales Sales Credit Exempt 
TOTAL MANUFACTURING 26. 1 35.9 33.0 38. 8 47.5 33. 5 
Non-metallic minerals 22.4 29.2 28.4 32. 3 41. 1 40. 4 
Basic iron and steel 26.4 37. 1 34.9 18. 7 21.3 17. 8 
Basic non—ferrous 18.2 24. 1 22.4 38. 2 51. 1 23. 7 
Metal products 19. 1 30.8 25.4 43. 7 34.8 37. 6 
Machinery 34.8 47. 1 43.5 59. 5 52. 1 44. 8 
Electrical equipment 54.7 66.5 62.4 80. 0 81.4 58. 6 
Transport equipment 53.7 60.0 69.0 67. 2 75.2 48. 2 
Wood 5.9 5.3 3.3 14. 8 18. 1 9. 0 
Furniture 4.9 6.3 5.3 3. 1 3.4 4. 5 
Pulp and paper 14.6 21.4 19. 1 22. 7 23.2 32. 2 
Rubber products 45. 1 67.8 70.7 83. 0 84.4 88. 3 
Leather and goods 9.6 13.9 11.9 21. 1 17.2 4. 9 
Chemicals 32.0 25. 1 20.3 9. 2 24.3 18. 4 
Pharm., cosmetics 46.9 59.0 54.3 57. 9 48.9 57. 8 
Plastics 11.9 17.8 17.9 20. O 25.9 12. 2 
Tex tiles 19.5 27.2 27.4 36. 6 36.2 45. 3 
Clothing 3. 1 5.6 5. 1 6. 9 10.2 0. 8 
Footwear 2.9 2.7 4.0 0. 9 1.7 0. 0 
Food and tobacco 12.6 20.6 20.4 30. 1 32.5 28. 2 
Printing 4.7 5.6 4.9 O. 1 O. 9 1. 7 
Other manufactures 27. 1 39.9 34.0 24. 7 36.5 47. 1 
Source: 1978 data base. 
Note: A foreign—owned firm is defined as one in which non-
residents control more than ten percent of the equity. 
2. FIRM SIZE AND EXPORTS 
Table 3 shows the distribution of the 3345 exporters by size 
and by subsector. Nearly half of the exporters in the sample 
reported adjusted total sales in excess of 100 million cruzeiros 
(five and a half million dollars) in 1978. The typical exporter 
in the manufacturing sector is thus a large firm, large at least 
by Brazilian standards. 
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Table 4 reports the percentage of firms in the total sample 
represented by exporters, again by size class and by subsector. 
The percentage of firms which export increases steadily from less 
than one percent in the smallest size class to more than sixty 
percent for firms with total sales of more than 100 million 
cruzeiros. This tendency is present in each of the 21 
Table 3 
Distribution of Exporters by Size and Subsector 
(number of firms) 
Size Class 
I II III IV V VI VII VIII 
TOTAL 9 15 40 63 244 565 778 1631 
Non-metallic minerals 0 0 1 1 8 16 19 57 
Basic iron and steel 0 0 1 0 3 16 18 70 
Basic non-ferrous metals 0 0 0 0 2 2 11 24 
Metal products 1 1 5 3 14 37 79 120 
Machinery 1 1 4 11 41 105 118 194 
Electrical equipment 0 1 1 1 13 35 60 121 
Transport equipment 0 1 1 1 13 30 30 108 
Wood 0 2 2 2 12 28 34 42 
Furniture 2 0 2 1 2 21 31 25 
Pulp and paper 1 0 0 1 9 11 16 47 
Rubber products 0 0 1 3 6 11 10 23 
Leather and leather goods 1 1 6 9 14 31 35 32 
Chemicals 1 3 2 2 10 21 46 112 
Pharmaceutical, cosmetics 0 1 3 3 7 11 13 48 
PIasti cs 0 0 3 3 8 11 19 40 
Texti1es 0 0 1 6 11 49 92 218 
CIothing 0 4 1 4 12 27 25 31 
Footwear 0 0 1 5 17 49 34 30 
Food, beverages, tobacco 2 0 3 4 21 24 53 225 
Printing 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 13 
Other manufactures 0 0 2 3 19 30 33 51 
Source: 1978 data base. 
Note: The size classes are defined as follows: 
I Less than 2 million cruzeiros in sales. 
II 2 — 4 million cruzeiros in sales. 
III 4 - 8 million cruzeiros in sales. 
IV 8 - 12 million cruzeiros in sales. 
V 12 - 25 million cruzeiros in sales. 
VI 25 - 50 million cruzeiros in sales. 
VII 50 - 100 million cruzeiros in sales. 
VIII More than 100 million cruzeiros in sales. 
During 1978 the average exchange rate was 18 cruzeiros per U.S. 
dollar. 
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subsectors. It would appear, then, that increased size increases 
the probability that a -firm will export. Size in itself is, 
however, no guarantee that a firm will export, and firms of quite 
modest size do export to foreign markets. Within each industry, 
the total sales of the smallest exporter is but a small 
percentage — usually less than one percent — of the sales of 
Table 4 
Percentage of Firms Which Export by Size and Subsector 
Size Class 
I II II I IV V VI VI I VII I 
TOTAL 0.6 2. 1 4. 2 7. 4 14. 9 25. 9 39. 8 61. 9 
Non-metallic minerals 0 0 4. 0 14. 3 19. 0 23. 2 31. 7 48. 7 
Basic iron and steel 0 0 16. 7 0 15. 0 32. 0 32. 7 67. 3 
Basic non-ferrous 0 0 0 0 6. 9 6. 7 36. 7 54. 5 
Metal products 0.9 3.4 7. 7 4. 0 11. 0 17. 8 40. 7 61. 9 
Machinery 2.0 4.0 6. 2 15. 3 28. 3 41. 5 57. 6 84. 0 
Electrical equipment 0 6.3 5. 9 5. 0 21. 0 28. 9 55. 6 74. 2 
Transport equipment 0 20.0 7. 7 8. 3 38. 2 38. 0 42. 9 76. 6 
Wood 0 4. B 4. 0 3. 9 14. 0 28. 6 52. 3 71. 2 
Furni ture 2.7 0 5. 9 •Ix* . 8 2. 5 21. 0 35. 2 61. 0 
Pulp and paper 0.7 0 C » 1. 4 6. 9 12. 0 25. 8 49. 5 
Rubber products 0 0 2. 9 6. 8 13. 0 30. 6 29. 4 74. 2 
Leather, leather goods 0. 5 1.3 6. 9 21. 4 20. 6 56. 4 92. 1 94. 1 
Chemi cals 12.5 23. 1 10. 5 8. 3 15. 4 16. 9 40. 0 52. 6 
Pharm., cosmetics 0 1.0 2. 7 5. 3 6. 5 17. 2 27. 1 53. 3 
PIasti cs 0 0 11. 1 9. 7 10. 5 11. 6 23. 5 54. 8 
Texti1es 0 0 5. 0 13. 3 12. 4 26. 8 48. 4 74. 9 
Clothing 0 8.0 2. 0 6. 2 10. 6 20. 9 27. 8 47. 7 
Footwear 0 0 8. 3 25. 0 36. 2 64. 5 69. 4 81. 1 
Food, tobacco 0.8 0 2. •-> 4. 3 12. 9 12. 5 20. 5 44. 3 
Pri nting 0 0 0 0 1 4. 7 0 4. 3 35. 1 
Other manufactures 0 0 10. 0 12. 5 31. 1 39. 5 48. 5 75. 0 
Source: 1978 data base. 
Note: The size classes are defined as follows: 
I Less than 2 million cruzeiros in sales. 
II 2 - 4 million cruzeiros in sales. 
Ill 4 - 8 million cruzeiros in sales. 
IV 8 - 1 2 million cruzeiros in sales. 
V 1 2 - 2 5 million cruzeiros in sales. 
VI 25 - 50 million cruzeiros in sales. 
VII 50 - 100 million cruzeiros in sales. 
VIII More than 100 million cruzeiros in sales. 
During 1978 the average exchange rate was 18 cruzeiros per U.S. 
dol1ar. 
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the largest non-exporter. Factors other than size obviously 
affect the decision to enter export markets, and these factors 
are analysed in chapter IV. 
Two measures of central tendency — the median and the mean 
— are reported in table 5 for the export/sales ratios of 
exporters in each manufacturing subsector. For the sample as a 
whole, the median ratio is only four percent whereas the mean 
ratio is fifteen percent. This suggests a highly skewed 
distribution, with a large number of exporters registering very 
low export-sales ratios. A logarithmic transformation of the 
data is thus appropriate for analytical techniques, such as 
ordinary least squares regression, that assume a normal 
di stri buti on. 
Table 6 reports three correlation coefficients for exporters 
in the entire manufacturing sector and in each subsector. Rank 
correlation has been used because it does not require any 
assumption regarding the distribution of the underlying data. 
The first correlation reported, that between exports and domestic 
Table 5 
Export/Sales Ratios (percentages) 
Number Standard 
of_firms medi_an mean devi_ati^on 
TOTAL 3345 3.97 15.25 24.16 
Non-metallic minerals 102 1.79 12.33 25.07 
Basic iron and steel 108 7.49 17. 16 21.30 
Basic non-ferrous metals 39 2. 18 12.67 21.26 
Metal products 260 1.97 6.43 12.64 
Machinery 475 4.77 10» 64 15.71 
Electrical equipment 232 2.50 7. 56 13.20 
Transport equipment 184 2.92 10.09 17.58 
Wood 122 20. 15 26.87 25.91 
Furniture 84 1.31 5.44 11.75 
Pulp and paper 85 0.96 7.44 17.75 
Rubber products 54 1.56 5.87 15.49 
Leather and leather goods 129 15.27 23« 63 24.59 
Chemicals 197 2.86 18.30 28.77 
Pharmaceutical and cosmetics 86 1.70 3.82 6.59 
PIasti cs 84 0.97 2.69 7.60 
Texti1es 377 5.25 14.83 22. 16 
Clothing 104 2.06 11.44 22.84 
Footwear 136 48.24 45.21 35. 79 
Food, beverages, tobacco 332 14. 55 30.15 32.88 
Printing 17 0.58 1.72 2.74 
Other manufactures 138 4.54 15.98 26.61 
Source: 1978 data base. 
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sales, tends to be positive, which shows that firms which rank 
high in export receipts tend also to rank high in sales to the 
Brazilian market. But most coefficients are well below unity, 
which suggests that the relationship is far from perfect. The 
second coefficient reports the correlation between export/sales 
ratios and total sales. This statistic tends to be small and not 
significantly different from zero. When the correlation is 
measured between domestic sales and the export ratio, there is a 
negative relationship in 19 subsectors, and the negative 
coefficient is statistically significant in ten subsectors. 
Large firms in terms of domestic sales thus tend to export a 
smaller proportion of their total output; but the transport 
equipment subsector represents a significant exception to this 
•general pattern. 
Table 6 
Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficients for Exporters: 
Exports and Domestic Sales 
Ex ports and X/S and X/S and 
dornest lc_sal_es total_sales 
TOTAL .295** -.022 -.232** 
Non-metallic minerals .311** -.111 -. 189 
Basic iron and steel .462** . 009 191* 
Basic non-ferrous metals .267 -.031 -. 161 
Metal products .484** .035 -.061 
Machi nery .501** . 118* -.018 
Electrical equipment .522** .048 -.016 
Transport equipment . 623**' .281** . 171* 
Wood . 123 -.070 -.440** 
Furni ture .251* -. 177 m «.WS.'« 
Pulp and paper .511** -.076 143 
Rubber products .508** .010 -.081' 
Leather, leather goods .364** . 138 -.186* 
Chemi cals .014 -.350** -.524** 
Pharmaceutical, cosmetics .601** -. 127 -. 157 
Plastics .601** -.097 -. 131 
Texti1es .272** .065 174** 
CIothi ng .215* -.031 -.219* 
Footwear -. 167 -.007 -.671** 
Food, beverages, tobacco .152** -.048 -.461** 
Printing .618** .071 .071 
Other manufactures .271** .008 -.200* 
Source: 1978 data base. 
* Coefficient is statistically significant at the .05 level 
in a two-tailed test. 
** Coefficient is statistically significant at the .01 level 
in a two-tailed test. 
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In sum, the descriptive statistics reported here provide 
considerable support for the hypothesized importance of scale 
economies: Because of the high fixed cost of exporting, larger 
firms are more likely to export than are small firms. However, 
among the firms that do export, firms with small domestic market 
sales are likely to have a higher ratio of exports to sales, for 
they have the most to gain from scale economies (cost reductions) 
through exports. Nevertheless, the subsector level is rather 
aggregate, and we have not yet controled for variations in 
variables other than size which affect the probability of 
exporting and subsequent export performance. 
3. FIRM SIZE AND EXPORT SUBSIDIES 
Such clear evidence of a negative association between export 
ratios and domestic sales is somewhat surprising, for the system 
of export subsidies in effect in 1978 discriminated against the 
small firm. As reported in table 7, there is a highly 
si gni f i c.iint and positive correlation between export volume and 
the the rate of subsidy through both the export credit (SI) and 
the income tax exemption (S2). Overall, the smaller the 
exporter, the smaller the export subsidy as a percentage of 
exports. This is generally true within each of the 21 subsectors 
as well, the only notable exceptions being basic non-ferrous 
metals and furniture. When the data are disaggregated to 139 
industries, statistically significant, positive coefficients 
between export volume and the sum of SI plus S2 are evident in 33 
industries. (See appendix B.) This is more than five times the 
number that would be expected by chance at the level of 
confidence employed. Moreover, not one of the statistically 
significant coefficients carries a negative sign. 
Our data base does not contain any information on subsidized 
credit received in conjunction with exports, but this financial 
incentive, though important, is not likely to have offset the 
bias against the small firm. On the contrary, it is quite likely 
that large firms obtain a disproportionate amount of subsidized 
credit. 
Most interestingly, 760 exporters in the sample received no 
export credit in 1978, and 1 229 received no income tax reduction 
from their export activities. A total of 523 exporters — 15.6% 
of the sample — received no fiscal incentive at all. With the 
exception of the chemical subsector, unsubsidized exporters tend 
to be much smaller, on average, than subsidized exporters. (See 
table 8.) Moreover, unsubsidized exporters can be found 
throughout the manufacturing sector: in 106 of the 139 
industries, at least one firm exported without the benefit of 
fiscal subsidies. 
It should be emphasized that the large variation in rates of 
export subsidy within manufacturing industries may well reflect 
an equally large variation in the types of products that are 
exported. Each firm has been allocated to the industry which 
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accounts -for the largest proport 
exports of a firm may be quite di 
particularly in the case of large, 
ion of its total sales. The 
stinct from its overall sales, 
multi-plant firms. 
Table 7 
Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficients for Exporters: Export 
Volume and Rate of Fiscal Subsidy 
B^Qb.-Corre^at^on^etween ExQorts_and 
Total Export Income Tax 
SybsidyiS). CreditiSl). gxemetionj(S2). 
TOTAL .202** .195** .176** 
Non-metallic minerals .320** . 249* .294** 
Basic iron and steel .302** .229* .248** 
E<asic non-ferrous metals 132 -. 176 .071 
Metal products .314** .312** .214** 
Machi nery .228** .239** . 110* 
Electrical equipment .232** .207** . 149* 
Transport equipment .33B** .323** .223** 
Wood . 178* . 050 .304** 
Furni ture . 125 . 143 .050 
Pulp and paper .332** .421** -.012 
Rubber products . 309* .243 .397** 
Leather and leather goods .343** .361** .221** 
Chemi cals . 163* . 149* .191** 
Pharmaceutical and cosmetics . 263* . 236* .302** 
PIasti cs .352** .301** .332** 
Texti1es .186** .149** .177** 
CIothi ng .272** .227* .419** 
Footwear .538** .377** .314** 
Food, beverages, tobacco . 117* . 085 .229** 
Pri nti ng .481* . 573* . 114 
Other manufactures .208* . 162 .233** 
Source: 1978 data base. 
* Coefficient is statistically significant at the .05 level 
in a two-tailed test. 
** Coefficient is statistically significant at the .01 level 
in a two-tailed test. 
Note: Subsidy rate <S, SI and S2) is defined as the ratio of 
subsidies to subsidy—inclusive export revenue. 
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Table 18 








TOTAL NOSUB TOTAL NOSUB TOTAL NOSUB 
TOTAL MANUFACTURING 3345 523 51. 0 26. 7 383. 6 433. 5 
Non-metallic minerals 102 24 16. 0 5. 5 273. 6 62. 6 
Basic iron and steel 108 7 89. 4 2. 8 878. 4 59. 1 
Basic non-ferrous 39 5 43. 6 35. 1 475. 3 259. 4 
Metal products 260 42 12. 6 14. 5 207. 4 130. 5 
Machinery 475 54 27. o 5. 1 213. 8 71. 5 
Electrical equipment 232 24 38. 9 2. 4 418. 7 216. 0 
Transport equipment 184 22 154. 1 2. 7 901. 0 95. B 
Wood 122 15 30. 9 10. 1 132. 6 66. 4 
F u m i ture 84 17 5. 4 0 . 7 102. 2 50. 6 
Pulp and paper 85 20 27. 3 2. 0 331. 5 230. 7 
Rubber products 54 16 27. 5 1 . 3 525. 8 65. 4 
Leather and goods 129 14 22. 2 1 . 1 83. 5 32. 3 
Chemi cais 197 39 55. 5 125. 7 1087. 4 3735. 9 
Pharm., cosmetics 86 25 12. 5 3. 8 507. 4 175. 5 
Plastics 84 13 4. 8 0 . 5 228. 4 52. 5 
Tex tiles 37 7 32 34. 3 4. 9 2 5 5 . 4 95. 2 
Clothing 104 18 8. 5 1. 3 114. 3 97. 1 
Footwear 136 17 36. 0 0 . 2 81. 7 61. 1 
Food and tobacco 332 98 175. 1 72. 9 614. 0 415. 8 
Printi ng 17 4 8. 9 0 . 3 427. 1 54. 5 
Other manufactures 138 17 26. 8 3. 1 174. 0 79. 4 
Source: 1978 data base. 
Subsidization of exports via income tax exemptions is 
related to the rate of profit, hence indirectly to capital 
intensity. It is thus understandable that this subsidy 
discriminates against small firms, which tend to use labor-
intensive techniques of production. It is not clear why the 
export credit (credito premio) should also discriminate against 
small exporters. Since the export credit in effect in 1978 
varied widely by product, rates must have been lower for those 
products exported predominantly by small firms. In addition, 
bureaucratic obstacles may have made it unattractive for a small 
exporter to incur the cost of collecting a subsidy to which it 
was entitled. 
24 
IV. LOBIT ANALY8I8 OF THE PROBABILITY OF EXPORTINS 
1. THE LOGIT MODEL 
In this chapter a single-equation, multivariate model is 
used to measure the effect of economic variables on the 
probability that a firm will be an exporter. The equation to be 
estimated is 
- Z where P^ = l/(l+e i>5 
Z. = brt +b,1nS. +b_lnK. +b,ADV. +b - STATE. +b_LIC. +b,FOR. i 0 1 i 2 i 3 i 4 l 5 i 6 i 
and the disturbance u. is an independently distributed random 
variable with zero mean. 
Yi is a dichotomous variable which takes the value of 1 if 
firm i exports and 0 if it does not. This type of binary choice 
model is referred to in the literature as logit analysis. (See 
Pindyck and Rubinfeld 1976, ch. 8 or Cox 1970.) The model 
restricts the estimated probabilities (the Pi's) to the zero-to-
one interval and assumes that a change in an independent variable 
will have its greatest impact on the probability of exporting 
when P would otherwise be equal to 1/2. At very low or very high 
probabi1ities, large changes in independent variables result in 
only small changes in the estimated probability. 
Estimation of the logit model presents two related problems. 
First, it is not appropriate to use ordinary least squares to 
estimate any equation with a dichotomous dependent variable, for 
the error term is heteroscedastistic, i.e. the variance of u. is i 
not the same for all observations. Since the Yi can assume only 
two different values, 0 or 1, observations for which the Pi are 
close to 0 or 1 will have small variances whereas those close to 
1/2 will have larger variances. It is possible to show that 
Pi(l-Pi) is a consistent estimate of the variance of the error 
term, so weighted least squares can be used to produce 
asymptotical1y efficient and unbiased estimates of the parameters 
of the model. (Kmenta 1971, pp. 425-27 and 461-62.) Secondly, 
the model is intrinsical1y nonlinear, so it is necessary to 
iteratively reweight the least squares results, where the weights 
are the reciprocals of the variances calculated from the previous 
iteration. In practice this means that somewhat more computer 
time is required than would otherwise be the case. <SAS 
Institute 1982, pp. 36-37.) 
The logit equation can also be expressed in the following 
way 2 
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where the dependent variable is the logarithm of the odds that a 
firm will export. This equation cannot, of course, be estimated 
directly, for the logarithms of zero and infinity are undefined. 
Therefore the first equation is the one that was actually 
estimated. 
The independent variable InS refers to the size of the firm 
as measured by the natural logarithm of the cruzeiro value of 
adjusted sales. The coefficient of InS is expected to be 
positive, for larger firms are more likely to export than are 
small firms given high fixed costs of exporting. 
Capital intensity (K) is defined as cruzeiro value-added per 
employee. Value-added per employee is highly correlated with the 
capital intensity of different industries (Lary 1968) and 
presumably different firms as well. In addition, it is possible 
to divide this measure of capital intensity into human capital 
intensity <HK) and physical capital intensity (PHK). The former 
is measured as the average annual wage whereas the latter is 
defined as non—wage value—added per employee. These two 
variables could not be calculated for 21 firms, including two 
exporters, which failed to report their 1978 wage bill. Measured 
non-wage value—added was negative for 1Q3 firms, so their 
physical capital intensity (PHK) was set equal to one cruzeiro. 
Value—added was estimated as total sales revenue plus change in 
inventories less purchases of raw materials, advertising, 
electricity, fuel and goods to be resold. The value-added of 
firms whose fiscal year differed from the calendar year was 
adjusted by the wholesale price index in order to make the 
statistics more comparable between firms. 
In accordance with the Heckscher—Ohlin theorem, a negative 
coefficient is thus expected for capital intensity, whether human 
or physical. Nonetheless it should be emphasized that our 
measure of capital intensity takes no account of indirect labor 
requirements. It is entirely conceivable that a firm may be use 
capital-intensive methods of production, yet utilize large 
amounts of unskilled labor in the form of inputs purchased from 
other firms in the economy. 
The advertising variable (ADV) is defined as the ratio of 
advertising expenditures to domestic sales. Dreze (I960) would 
predict a negative coefficient for this variable because 
countries which have little weight in world trade are expected in 
export markets to specialize in standardized goods which compete 
on the basis of price rather than advertising. As explained in 
chapter II, monopolistic competition in a protected domestic 
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market can conceivably reduce the importance of the "Dreze 
hypothesis" or even produce a positive coefficient. 
STATE is a dummy variable which takes the value of unity if 
the government holds equity in the firm, and the vaue of zero 
otherwise. Eight of the 21 public enterpises in the sample are 
exporters. No particular sign is expected a priori. for the 
coefficient of this variable. 
LIC is a dummy variable which is equal to one if a 
firm in which residents own ninety percent or more of the equity 
has a licensing agreement with an overseas firm, and zero 
otherwise. More than half of these 245 firms registered exports 
in 1978. The coefficient of this variable can be negative, if 
overseas firms prevent licensees from competing in export 
markets, or positive, if access to foreign technology and 
trademarks gives licensees a competitive edge in exports. 
FOR takes a value of one if non-resident owners hold more 
than - ten percent of the equity of a firm, and zero if foreign 
ownership is ten percent or less. This variable is thus broadly 
defined to include joint ventures of national and foreign firms 
as well as foreign-control1ed firms. Nearly three-quarters of 
the 841 firms in which foreigners held more than ten percent of 
the equity recorded exports in 1978. A positive coefficient is 
expected for this variable. 
The same logit model was estimated for each manufacturing 
subsector, with only two changes. First, the STATE dummy was 
deleted due to an insufficient number of public enterprises in 
the sample. Secondly, the dummy variables LIC and FOR were 
combined into a variable labelled LICFOR which takes the value of 
unity if a firm has foreign licensing agreements or foreign 
direct investment amounting to more than ten percent of its 
equity, and zero otherwise. 
2. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Table 9 reports the mean and standard deviation of the 
explanatory variables for the sample as a whole as well as for 
the subsets of exporters and nonexporters. Exporters are clearly 
larger than nonexporters, utilize more skill- and capital-
intensive techniques of production and exhibit a higher ratio of 
advertising to domestic sales. From the disaggregate data 
reported in appendix table C-l, it can be seen that this is 
generally true in each subsector as well. The only exceptions 
are rubber products, where exporters have low advertising ratios, 
and footwear, where exporters' output is slightly less capital-
intensive than that of nonexporters. Nontheless, it would not be 
correct to conclude that each of these variables necessarily has 
a positive impact on the probability of exporting, for there are 
significant positive correlations between the explanatory 
variables themselves. (See table 10.) Firms that export may be 
relatively capital-intensive not by virtue of the fact that they 
sell part of their output to foreign markets, but rather because 
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they are large. To determine the independent effect of capital 
intensity on export performance, holding constant other relevant 
variables such as size, a multivariate approach is needed. 
Precisely such an approach is provided by the logit regression 
model. 
Tables 11 and 12 report parameters for 27 equations which 
were estimated by iteratively reweighted least squares, the 
weights being the reciprocals of Pi<l-Pi). In equations 01 and 
04 the intercept was held constant over all firms, whereas in the 
other four equations of table 11 it was allowed to vary by 
subsector. 
a) 
The coefficient of the logarithm of sales (InS) is positive 
as expected and highly significant. Its magnitude ranges from 
0.8 to 0.9 in regressions employing the full sample of firms, 
which indicates that a ten percent increase in the size of a 
firm, as measured by total sales, is associated with an eight to 
nine percent increase in the odds of exporting iP/(l-P)3-. In the 
subsector regressions reported in table 12 the coefficient is 
significant in every case at the .01 level and its magnitude 
ranges from a low of 0.47 (chemicals) to a high of 1.67 
(footwear). 
Table 9 
Mean and Standard Deviation of Variables in Logit Regression 
Variable Description 
InS ln(total sales) 
nonexporters 
exporters 
InK 1 n(value-added per employee) 
nonexporters 
exporters 
ADV advertising/domestic sales 
nonexporters 
exporters 
InHK In(wage bill per employee) 
nonexporters 
exporters 




Me »an Deviation 
16. 984 1.940 
16. 418 1.808 
18. 521 1.370 
12. 154 0.872 
12. 077 0.909 
12. 365 0.720 
0. 007 0.024 
0. 006 0.010 
0. 010 0.033 
10. 959 0.760 
10. 868 0.781 
11. 207 0.635 
11. 560 1.736 
11. 448 1.883 
11. 864 1.201 
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Table 18 
Simple Correlation between Variables in Logit Regression 
InS InK ADV InHK InPHK 
InS 1. 000 0. 463 0. 066 0. 497 0. 340 
InK 0. 463 1. 000 0. 051 0. 696 0. 734 
ADV 0. 066 0. 051 1. 000 0. 081 -0. 006 
InHK 0. 497. 0. 696 0. 081 1. 000 0. 309 
InPHK 0. 340 0. 734 -0. 006 0. 309 1. 000 
Note: All coefficients except that for the correlation between 
ADV and InPHK (-0.006) are statistical1y significant at 
the .01 level. 
b) Capi tal_ Intensity 
The variable for total capital intensity (K) is highly 
significant and has the negative coefficient suggested by 
standard trade theory, but the elasticity increases markedly in 
absolute size from -0.35 to -0.91 when subsector dummies are 
included in the regression. This appears to be due to 
observations in the footwear subsector which are outliers with 
respect to this variable and others as well. In regression 
equation 03, which excludes the 272 footwear firms but includes 
20 dummy variables, the estimated elasticity of capital intensity 
is only -0.34. In 19 of the 21 subsector regressions, the 
coefficient of capital intensity is negative, significantly so at 
the .05 level in a two-tailed test in nine equations. Pulp and 
paper is the only subsector to show a significantly positive 
coefficient for capital intensity. 
When human capital intensity (HK) and physical capital 
intensity (PHK) enter the equation, both have the expected 
negative coefficients, but the coefficient of InHK is much higher 
than that of InPHK. This suggests that variations in skill 
intensity, as measured by average wages, have a much greater 
impact on the probability of exporting than do variations in 
physical plant and equipment. 
c) Advertising_^ntensity 
The advertising variable (ADV) carries a significantly 
positive coefficient in all of the equations reported in table 
11. This implies that Brazilian firms producing highly 
advertised, hence highly differentiated, goods are more likely to 
export than are firms producing standardized commodities. Such a 
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finding is opposite that predicted by the Dreze hypothesis, but 
it is consistent with the existence of "excess capacity" due to 
monopolistic competition in the protected Brazilian market. 
To test whether the positive coefficient for ADV might be a 
product of errors in the data, 141 observations were deleted in 
which the advertising/domestic sales ratio was very high (8V. or 
higher). Regression equations 01 and 02 were then re-estimated 
with the restricted sample. The coefficient for advertising 
actually increased from 5.246 to 14.043 in equation 01 and from 
7.299 to 22.960 in equation 02 with little effect on the size or 
significance of other parameters of the model. The results 
reported in table 11 may thus underestimate the magnitude, though 
not the statistical significance, of the impact of advertising on 
the probability of exporting. 
In the subsector regressions listed in table 12, ADV has a 
pggjtive eeefficsnt in 19 equations and a significantly positive 
coefficient in nine equations. In view of the fact that our v 
expectation of a positive coefficient is based on the excess 
capacity theorem of the theory of monopolistic competition, it 
may seem strange that the highest coefficients (97.2 and 85.8) 
occur in basic iron and steel and in basic non-ferrous metals, 
subsectors with very low advertising ratios. In interpreting 
these subsector results it is important to recall that the data 
refer to firms, not plants or establishments, and each firm has 
been allocated to the industry which accounts for the largest 
proportion of its total sales. A relatively high advertising 
ratio for a firm in the iron and steel subsector, for example, 
may well be indicative of diversification, with considerable 
production and exports from plants operating in monopolistical 1 y 
competitive industries. 
Equally noteworthy is the fact that the coefficient of ADV 
in the pharmaceutical and cosmetics subsector — everyone's 
example of monopolistic competition — is quite low (2.1) and not 
statistically different from zero. Three possible explanations 
of this result come to mind. First, advertising ratios in this 
subsector are quite high, so the ADV variable may be a poor 
indicator of inter-firm variations in "excess capacity" within 
the subsector. Secondly, industries in this subsector have 
relatively high prices, and presumably high costs, compared to 
foreign producers. (See appendix table D-l of this report.) 
Unless sales expansion can reduce average costs to a level below 
export prices plus subsidies, there is no incentive to export 
regardless of the existence of "excess capacity." Finally, 
international brand names are very important for pharmaceutical 
products, soap and cosmetics, so export markets are likely to be 
as monopolistical 1 y competitive as the domestic market. In this 
case the assumption of highly elastic demand for exports would 



















InS 0.096** 0.787** 0.970** 
(0.021) (0.021) (0.071) 
0.881** 0.803** 0.965** 
(0.021) (0.021) (0.071) 
InK -0.350** -0.913** -0.339** 










































































Note: The numbers in parentheses are the asymptotic standard 
errors of the estimated coefficients. A single asterisk 
(*) indicates that a coefficient is significantly 
different from zero at the .05 level of confidence and a 
double asterisk (**) indicates significance at the .01 
1evel. 
a/ Excludes footwear. 
b/ The constant term in this regression was allowed to vary by 
subsector. The estimated coefficients of the 21 dummy terms 
are reported in appendix table C-2. 
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Table 18 




OS Basic iron and 
steel 
09 Basic nonfer. 
metals 


















25 Food, tobacco 
26 Printing 
27 Other manuf. 
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Note: The statistics in parentheses are the asymptotic standard 
errors of the coefficients. (*> indicates significance at the .05 
level of confidence and (**) at the .01 level. 
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d ) St ate_Ownershi Bj._For gi90_0wnershi g_and_Liçenses 
The coefficient of the dummy variable STATE is negative, 
which indicates, other things equal, that a public enterprise is 
less likely to export than is a firm under private ownership. 
Nonetheless, the coefficient is statistically significant at the 
0.05 level only when the constant term is constrained to be the 
same for all subsectors. 
In contrast, the coefficients of LIC and FOR are 
significantly positive, and the latter is nearly twice as large 
as the former. The licensing dummy, for some unknown reason, 
loses statistical significance when the footwear subsector is 
deleted from the sample. It appears then that one can conclude 
with a high degree of confidence that foreign direct investment 
in a firm increases the odds that the firm will be an exporter, 
but such a positive effect from foreign licensing agreements is 
less certain. In the subsector regressions reported in table 
4, the LICFOR dummy shows a positive coefficient in all but two 
subsectors — leather and footwear — and in these two subsectors 
there is a particularly low incidence of foreign licenses and 
foreign ownership. In only seven subsectors, however, is a 
positive LICFOR coefficient significant at the .05 level of 
cranf i df?nce. 
Some experimentation was done that was not successful and 
for this reason is not reported here. The Herfindahl index of 
concentrâtion was entered into the logit regression under the 
assumption that small firms are induced to export from highly 
concentrated industries. In no case was the coefficient 
significantly different from zero, in contrast to the result 
predicted by Auquier (1980, p. 211). An attempt was also made 
to enter interaction terms of subsector dummies with InS, i.e. to 
allow the size coefficient to vary by subsector. This 
specification proved to be very costly in terms of computer time, 
so the attempt was abandoned when convergence failed to occur 
within a reasonable number of iterations. 
e) HLystratign_gf _th§!_U§?_9£ 
The estimated parameters of the logit equations can easily 
be used to calculate probabilities. Assume, for example, that 
one wishes to predict the probability of exporting for a firm 
with 1978 sales of 100 million cruzeiros (InS = 18.421), value-
added per employee of 180 thousand cruzeiros (InK = 12.101), and 
no advertising, state ownership, foreign licenses or foreign 
owners. From equation 01, the natural logarithm of the odds of 
exporting is -12.559 + 0.896(18.421) - 0.350(12.101) or -0.289. 
Taking anti1ogarithms and solving for P ^ the probability that 
such a firm will ©«port is found to be .43. If the same firm is 
under foreign ownership, the calculated logarithm of the odds 
increases by 0.941 to 0.652 and the probabililty of exporting 
increases to .66. 
It is also possible to see how the probability of exporting 
for each category of firm changes as the size of firm increases, 
holding all other variables constant. Table 13 reports such an 
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exercise utilising equation 01 of table 11. If equation 02 had 
been used for these calculations, the effect of size would have 
been somewhat larger and if equation 03 had been used it would 
have been larger. Table 14 reports a similar exercise for 
changes in capital intensity and advertising, holding size and 
the three dummy terms constant. It should be noted that the 10 
to 14 capital intensity range corresponds to a range of 22 
thousand to 1.2 million cruzeiros (approximately 1 200 to 66 BOO 
dollars) in value-added per employee. 
Table 13 
Illustration of the Relationship between Size, Ownership 
and th© Prebafeilitey that a Firm will Inpspt 
Total Sales _ExQorti_ng 
(mi 11i on Publi c 
^Dt^ilECise 




4 .01 .04 .07 . 10 
8 .02 . 09 . 12 . 17 
12 .03 . 10 . 17 a A.W1 
25 . 05 . 18 .28 .36 
50 .09 .29 . 42 .51 
100 . 16 .43 .58 .66 
200 .26 . 59 .72 .78 
400 . 40 . 73 . 83 .87 
Source: Calculated from equation 01 of table 11 with variables 




Illustration of the Relationship between Capital Intensity, 
Advertising and the Probability that a Firm will Export 
Adverti sing Cag)i_tal_ Intensity b/ 
-Incensity_a/ 10 11 12 13 14 
0 .61 . 52 .44 . 35 .28 
.01 .62 . 54 .45 .37 .29 
.02 . 63 . 55 .46 .38 . 30 
.04 .66 . 58 .49 .40 .32 
. 10 .73 . 65 .57 .48 .39 
Source: Calculated from equation 01 of table 11 with firm 
size set equal to 100 million cruzeiros and the dummy 
variables STATE, LIC and FOR set equal to zero. 
a/ Ratio of advertising expenditures to domestic sales. 
b/ The natural logarithm of cruzeiros of value-added per employee. 
V. REQRES8I0N ANALY9I8 OF EXPORT PERFORMANCE 
Chapter IV analyzed factors which affect a firm's decision 
to enter export markets. In this chapter attention is focused on 
a second question: Once the export decision has been made, what 
determines the allocation of output between foreign and domestic 
markets? Data for 3 345 exporters are used to test the 
hypotheses discussed in chapter II. 
1. THE ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES REGRESSION MODEL 
The basic model chosen for a simultaneous test of these 
hypotheses draws heavily on Glejser et al. (1980): 
In (X . ,/DS. .) = b.D. + b. D . 1 n (DS. .) + b„_,Dl n (EST. .) + b_0,.ln(K. .) ij ij j j k j lj 279 ij 2SO ij 
+ b 2 8 1 A D V i j + b282 Tj + b 2 8 3 S 1 D i j + b284 S 1ij 
+ b 2 8 5 S 2 D i j + b286 S 2ij + b287 Vj + b288 Hj 
+ b o a_STATE. . + b , L I C . . + b o o,F0R. . + u. J 289 aj 29U ij 291 ij ij 
i = 1, 2, . ... n . n. > 2 
J J 
j » 1, 2, ..., 139 
k = 140, 141, ..., 278 
b k < 0 b 2 7 9 > 0 b 2 8 0 = ? b 2 8 1 = ? b 2 8 2 < 0 
b 2 8 3 > 0 b 2 8 4 > 0 b 2 8 5 > 0 b 2 8 6 > 0 
b 2 8 7 < 0 b 2 8 8 > 0 b 2 8 9 = ? b290==? b 2 9 1 > 0 
where 
the subscripts i and j refer to the ith firm and the jth 
industry, respectively; 
ln(X. ,/DS. .), the dependent variable, is the natural logarithm of 
J Jthe ratio of exports to domestic sales, so can take 
any positive or negative value. The cruzeiro value of 
both exports and sales for those firms whose fiscal 
year differed from the calendar year was adjusted by 
the wholesale price index for manufactures so as to 
make the inter-firm statistics more comparable. Export 
subsidies are included as a part of the export and 
total sales revenue. 
D is a dummy variable corresponding to one of the 139 
industries to which a firm belongs} 
D,ln(DS.. ) is the natural logarithm of sales (in cruzeiros) i j i 
multiplied by the industry dummy so that b j , the size 
elasticity, takes a different value in each industry. 
In another specification of this model, this variable 
is replaced by ln(DSij), constraining the size 
elasticity to be the same for all industries. 
EST. . is the number of establishments owned by a particular 
i J firms 
K. . is the value-added (in adjusted cruzeiros) per employee, 
J a commonly used proxy for capital intensity. In 
another version of the model, this variable is 
replaced by HKij and PHKij, which is wages per 
employee and non-wage value-added per employee, 
respectively. These two variables are proxies for 
human and physical capital intensities. (See Lary 
1968.) They could not be measured for two firms which 
failed to report their 1978 wage bill. Measured non-
wage value-added was negative for 17 of the remaining 
3 343 firms, so their physical capital intensity was 
set equal to one cruzeiro so that its logarithm could 
be defined. Value-added was estimated as total sales 
revenue plus value of changes in stock less purchases 
of raw materials, advertising, electricity, fuel and 
goods to be resold. 
is a firm's expenditures on advertising expressed as a 
proportion of domestic sales; 
T. is the implicit tariff of an industry, measured as the 
J excess price of domestic over import prices; 
SID.. is a dummy variable which takes the value of one if an 
J exporter receives an export tax credit (credito 
premio) and the value of zero otherwise; 
ADV. . i J 
SI. is the export tax credit of a firm expressed as a proportion 
J of total export revenue, including export subsidies; 
S2D.. is a dummy variable which takes the value of one if a firm 
J pays reduced corporate income tax by virtue of its 
export activity, and the value of zero otherwise; 
S2.. is the export credit equivalent of the reduction in taxable 
J income expressed as a proportion of the firm's total 
export revenue. Export credits are taxable as income 
at the standard rate of 30%, so the export credit 
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equivalent of the reduction in taxable income due to 
export activity is 0.3/0.7 <=0.43) times the reduction 
in taxable income. 
V^ . is the ratio of value-added to total output, intended as a 
J measure of the degree of vertical integration of the 
firm? 
H. is the Herfindahl index of concentrâtion of domestic sales in 
J a particular industry, defined as the sum of the 
squares of market shares of the individual firms} 
STATE^. is a dummy variable which takes the value of unity if the 
J government holds equity in the firm, and the value of 
zero otherwise? 
LIC. is a dummy variable equal to unity if a nationally owned 
J firm has a licensing agreement with an overseas firm, 
and equal to zero otherwise? 
FOR. takes the value of one if non-resident owners hold more 
J than ten percent of the equity of the firm and zero if 
foreign ownership amounts to ten percent or less of 
the equity; 
u.. is an independent error term with zero mean and constant 
J variance. Since the variance of the dependent 
variable is a decreasing function of the size of the 
firm, the assumption of constant variance 
(homoscedasticity) was not expected to be realistic. 
Most surprisingly, analysis of the residuals of 
several regression equations revealed no evidence of 
heteroscedasticity, so no correction of the ordinary 
ls®»t fflqudtr©» results was required. 
2. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Table 15 lists the mean and standard deviation of the 
explanatory variables which enter the regression equations, and 
table 16 reports the simple correlation matrix for these 
variables. The main regression results are shown in table 17, 
which contains estimated coefficients for six specifications of 
the basic model. Equation 01 has a constant term, but excludes 
the industry dummies <Dj>, which do enter equation 02. The 139 
industry dummies are also entered along with dummy-domestic sales 
interaction terms in equation 03. The estimated coefficients for 
the industry dummies and interaction terms can be found in 
appendices B, C and D. Equations 04 through 06 are identical to 
the first three equations except that human and physical capital 
replace the capital intensity variable. 
In general, the regression results are most satisfactory 
from the point of view of goodness of fit. In equation 01 all of 
the estimated coefficients are significantly different from zero 
at the .01 level of confidence in a two-tailed test, and in 
equation 04 all but one coefficient is significant at this level 
of confidence. The industry terms add considerably to the 
explanatory poweç of the equation, for the coefficient of 
determination <R't"> i ncreases from .33 to .79 with the addition of 
industry dummies, and again to .81 when the coefficient of 
domestic sales is allowed to vary by industry. The full model 
thus "explains" more than 80% of the variation of the dependent 
variable. 
Rather than discuss each specification of the model in turn, 
it seems preferable to present the results by variable, as they 
relate to the hypotheses discussed in chapter II. 
Table 15 
Mean and Standard Deviation of Variables in Regression 
Standard 
y§!li§!2i§_§Qd_Descrigt i on Mean Deviation 
— & . — — — — — — 
In(X. ,/DS. .) 1J 1J In (ratio of exports/domestic sales) —3. 087 (2. 539) 
InDS.. 1J In(domestic sales) 18. 234 (1. 593) 
InEST.. 1J In (number of establishments) 0. 512 (0. 683) 
InK. . ij In(value-added per employee) 12. 365 (0. 720) 
InHK.. In (wage bill per employee) 11. 207 (0. 635) 
InPHK.. 1J In(non-wage value-added/employee) 11. 864 (1. 201) 
ADV. . 1J advertising/domestic sales 0. 010 ' (0. 033) 
T . J implicit tariff 0. 180 (0. 325) 
S 1ij export credit/exports 0. 131 (0. 126) 
S 2 u profit tax subsidy equi valent/exports 0. 022 (0. 029) 
V. . 1 J value-added/output 0. 555 (0. 161) 
H. 1 Herfindahl index of concentrâtion 0. 069 (0. 091) 
Sum 
STATE-owned enterprises 8 
Licensing agreements with foreign firms 148 
FOReign particpation in equity 610 
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a) Seale_Econgmies 
When the coefficient of the domestic sales variable is 
constrained to be identical for all 139 industries, its sign is 
significantly negative as hypothesized. (See equations 01, 02, 
04 and 05 of table 17.) The coefficient of the establishment 
variable is also highly significant and has the positive sign 
predicted by the scale economies hypothesis. Most interestingly, 
the absolute size of the coefficient of InEST is considerably 
smaller than that of InDS. This suggests that a doubling of the 
number of plants per firm has less impact on export ratios than 
does a 507. reduction in domestic sales. In short, there is 
strong evidence of the importance of economies of scale at the 
plant level, but the results also lend same support to the 
? considerations of product differentiation and demand factors 
stressed by Auquier (1980). 
Table 16 
Correlation Matrix 
InDS l.nK InHK InPHK ADV T SI S2 V H 
In(X/DS) -.363 -.004 -.145 .001 .123 -.059 .025 .108 -.104 .032 
InDS 1.000 .305 .366 .230 -.128 -.047 .033 .039 -.092 .132 
InK .305 1.000 .757 .753 .017 .075 -.063 .145 -.002 .113 
InHK .366 .757 1.000 .398 .043 .128 -.043 -.049 .060 .063 
InPHK .230 .753 .398 1.000 -.030 .031 -.035 .176 .034 .060 
ADV -.128 .017 .043 -.030 1.000 .067 -.011 -.002 .016 .077 
T -.047 .075 .128 .031 .067 1.000 .007 .052 .211 .018 
51 .033 -.063 -.043 -.035 -.011 .007 1.000 .082 .115 -.011 
52 .039 .145 -.049 .176 -.002 .052 .082 1.000 .274 .024 
V -.092 -.002 .060 .034 .016 .211 .115 .274 1.000 -.085 
H .132 .113 .063 .060 .077 .018 -.011 .024 -.085 1.000 
Note: Coefficients with an absolute value of .034 or greater 
are statistically significant at the .05 level and 
coefficients with an absolute value of .044 or. greater 
are significant at the .01 level. 
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Equation 03 is a rigorous test o-f the scale economies 
hypothesis, for in this specification both the intercept and the 
domestic sales coefficient are allowed to vary by industry. As 
can be seen in appendix D, the sales elasticities are negative in 
121 of the 139 industries, significantly so at the .01 level in 
50 industries. In contrast, none of the positive coefficients 
are significantly different from zero at the .05 level of 
confidence. Estimated elasticities of less than -1 indicate that 
increasing domestic sales is associated not only with a decline 
in the export-sales ratio, but also with an absolute decline in 
export volume. It is thus noteworthy that 40 of the 139 sales 
elasticities in equation 03 are less than -1, eight significantly 
so at the .05 level of confidence. The specification of equation 
06 produces almost identical results. 
b) Cagitai_I^n tensity 
The coefficient of capital intensity is highly significant, 
and its positive sign is opposite that which would be predicted 
for Brazil by standard trade theory. Moreover, its significance 
is attributable solely to variations in physical capital 
intensity, for the coefficient of the human capital variable is 
small and not significantly different from zero in equations 04 
through 06. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that 
the influence of economies of scale overwhelms the role of factor 
proportions emphasized in the conventional theory of 
international trade. A firm with a large investment in plant and 
equipment requires a larger volume of exports to reduce average 
costs to a minimum than does a firm with the same volume of 
domestic sales but less capital-intensive production techniques. 
It is interesting to note that the simple correlation 
between capital intensity and export ratios is quite different 
from the partial correlation implicit in the regression 
equations. As can be seen in the first line of table 16, the 
simple correlation between the logarithm of X/DS and that of K or 
PHK is very low and not significantly different from zero. In 
contrast, the correlation between the logarithm of the wage rate 
(InHK) and the logarithm of the export ratio is negative and 
highly significant. The multiple regression results indicate 
that this negative correlation, though statistically significant, 
is spurious and that skill levels as measured by the average wage 
have no independent effect on export ratios. Wage rates are 
positively correlated with domestic sales; firms with a high 
volume of domestic sales export proportionately less not because 
their wages are high but rather because they can achieve 
economies of scale in the domestic market with less need to enter 
competitive international markets. Similarly, the correlation 
between domestic sales and physical capital intensity obscures 
the positive effect that the latter has on export ratios. 
c) Advertising_intensi_ty 
The coefficient of advertising is highly significant and, 
like the capital intensity variable, its sign is opposite that 
which would be predicted by trade theorists (Dreze 1960). Firms 
producing highly advertised, hence highly differentiated products 
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export a larger proportion of their output than do firms 
producing standardized manufactures. This finding is consistent 
with the hypothesis that firms in monopolistic competition will 
seek export markets because of the existence of "excess capacity" 
in the sense that long-run marginal costs of production are well 
below long-run average costs. 
The advertising variable is defined as the ratio of 
advertising expenditures to domestic sales. Since the domestic 
sales term also enters the denominator of the dependent variable, 
the possibility exists that the coefficient for ADV is biased 
upwards as a result of errors in the measurement of domestic 
sales. To test this hypothesis, fifty observations were deleted 
in which the advertising/domestic sales ratio was very high <8% 
or more). Regression equations 01 through 03 were then re-
estimated with the restricted sample of firms. In equation 01 
the coefficient of ADV fell to -0.7, and was not significantly 
different from zero, while other coefficients were affected very 
little. In equations 02 and 03, however, the coefficient 
-increased from 5.4 to 10.6 and from 8.7 to 12.2 respectively, 
retaining its high level of statistical significance. For the 
full regression model, the reported results for the advertising 
variable are thus quite robust. 
d) I(DeIi£it_Tari£l_Prgtection 
In equations 01 and 04, the coefficient of the tariff 
variable is negative as expected and is significant at the .01 
level of confidence. For each percentage point increase in the 
ratio of domestic to import prices, the volume of exports falls 
by three-quarters of a percentage point. It appears that high 
domestic prices by and large do reflect high production costs or 
serve as an incentive to supply the domestic market at the 
expense of exports. Protectionist commercial policies are thus a 
serious impediment to the export of manufactures in Brazil. 
The variable Tj can also be interpreted as the cross-
sectional equivalent of a real exchange rate. Over time, an 
aggregate index of the real value of the cruzeiro is simply the 
ratio of domestic prices to international prices, divided by the 
nominal exchange rate (cruzeiros per unit of foreign currency). 
At a point in time, the nominal exchange rate is the same for all 
firms, but industries differ in the ratio of domestic to 
international prices. The higher this ratio, the greater the 
"overvaluation" of the cruzeiro in that industry, and the less 
competitive will firms be in export markets. Most interestingly, 
our estimated elasticity of 0.75 is only slightly lower than 
long-run supply elasticities calculated with time series data. 
(See Braga and Markwald 1983.) 
Although the size of the coefficient of Tj is quite 
plausible, two caveats should be noted regarding the underlying 
data. First, the tariff data are rather aggregate, for only 77 
separate tariff rates were available for the 139 industries 
covered in this study. (See appendix table D-l.) Secondly, 
calculations of the implicit tariff are based on direct price 
42 
comparisons made in late 1980 and early 1981, two to three years 
a-fter the relevant time period for the remainder of the 
explanatory variables. Data for legal tariffs are available, but 
these were not used because Tyler (1983b) has shown that there is 
widespread tariff redundancy in Brazil, and virtually no 
correlation whatsoever between legal and implicit tariffs. 
Due to severe multicol1inearity, it was not possible to 
estimate the regression equations which include the implicit 
tariff variable along with the- 139 industry dummy terms. 
>< Therefore, in those equations the coefficient of Tj is 
constrained to take the value obtained in regressions which 
exclude the industry dummies. 
t" 
e) Exgor t_Subsi_dies 
The Brazilian government uses both fiscal and financial 
incentives as export subsidies to offset, at least in part, the 
anti-export bias of the system of protection. At the level of 
the firm, it has been possible to obtain information for only two 
types of fiscal incentives: SI, the export tax credit <credito 
premio) and S2, the export credit equivalent of the reduction in 
corporate income tax attributable to exports. SI is by far the 
most important of the two subsidies, averaging 13.1% for the 
firms in our sample compared to only 2.27. for S2. The simple 
correlation between SI and S2 is significant, but a relatively 
low .082. SI is negatively correlated with both human and physi-
cal capital intensity, whereas S2, which is based on profits, 
hence indirectly on capital intensity, shows a high positive 
correlation with physical capital intensity. (See table 16.) 
Financial incentives are omitted entirely from the 
regression analysis. No data are available by firm, but Musalem 
(1981) has estimated that the subsidy element of export financing 
amounted to 10.5% of total exports of manufactures in 1978. It 
is also impossible to obtain data by firm on the use of the 
drawback provision for imported inputs, but the vertical 
integration variable (Vij) is intended to act as a proxy for this 
fiscal incentive. 
f 
Both SI and S2 enter the regression equation in two distinct 
ways. A dummy variable first captures the effect of the presence 
of any positive subsidy on export ratios. The subsidy rate 
itself is then entered simultaneously as a measure of the impact 
of increased subsidies on export performance at the margin. 
This specification provides an unconstrained estimate of the 
marginal effect of changes in the rate of subsidy on export 
performance. 
The coefficient of S2 is significant in all equations and 
has the expected positive sign. In the full model (equation 03 
or 06), its size implies that a one percentage point increase in 
the rate of subsidization through income tax reductions produces 
a three percent increase in export volume. This elasticity is 
much higher than that of the implicit tariff variable, but it 
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Table 18 
Ordinary Least Squares Analysis of Export Performance 
Var i_abl e £ Ì£Ì!=Qts 
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Table 17 (continued) 
Vari able 
01 02 
Rs3C§s5ion_Coef fi^c i_ent s_ 
03 04 05 06 
STATE.. 2.495** 



































. 331 791 813 .328 . 791 si; 
The numbers in parentheses are the standard errors of the 
coefficients. (*) indicates significance at the .05 level 
and (**) at the .01 level. 
a/ Coefficient varies by industry. See appendix tables D-2, D-3 
and D—4. 
b/ An a priori restriction for the coefficient of this variable 
was necessary because of multicol 1inearity. 
should be noted that it is not significantly higher in a 
statistical sense. 
The coefficient of SI, in contrast, is significantly 
negative. The net effect of thé export tax credit (SID + SI) is 
positive, but the marginal effect on exports of increases in the 
subsidy appears to be negative. Higher rates of subsidy are thus 
* associated with reduced export volume. This unexpected finding 
is the product of a defect in the underlying data: SI includes 
not only subsidies for exports of the current year, but also an 
f unknown amount of accumulated subsidies for exports of previous 
years. 
Export subsidies in the form of tax credits were originally 
given by state governments as well as the federal government. 
Because of budgetary problems, many states found themselves 
unable to honor their committments to exporters, so in 1977 the 
federal government allowed firms to utilize half of their 
accumulated state credits in payment of federal IPI taxes. In 
1978 this percentage was increased to 100% and in 1979 the 
federal government took full responsibility for all fiscal 
incentives to exports. Export tax credits are taxable as income 
in the year that they are actually used. Since the income tax 
data for all firms in our sample cover fiscal years ending in 
1978, the use of accumulated tax credits introduces a serious 
distortion in the SI variable. Export revenue is defined as 
inclusive of subsidies, so a firm which utilized accumulated 
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export credits in 1978 without actually exporting in that year 
appears to have a subsidy rate of 100%. Firms with a small 
volume of exports relative to accumulated export credits can also 
show quite high apparent rates of subsidy. In general, for all 
firms utilising accumulated export credits, the SI variable is 
biased upwards, which biases downwards the estimate of the 
coefficient of SI. 
In an attempt to improve the estimate of the effect of the 
export credit on export supply, 44 firms for which SI was 407. or 
i higher were deleted from the sample. The results are shown in 
equations 07 through 09 of table 18. With the removal of these 
outliers, the coefficient of SI becomes positive and is 
" significant at the .01 level in the full model. Since the 
coefficient is still biased downwards because of the inclusion of 
an unknown amount of accumulated export credits, one can safely 
conclude that export subsidies given in the form of tax credits 
are at least as efficacious as subsidies given in the form of 
income tax reductions. 
These errors in the measurement of export subsidies also 
affect the measurement of exports, hence export ratios. For this 
reason the regression equations were re-estimated utilizing data 
only for the 760 firms which received no subsidies whatsoever in 
the form of export credits. As shown in chapter II, it is the 
smallest exporters which tend to receive no export credits, so 
this is hardly a random sample of firms» nonetheless, equation 10 
in table 18 compares quite favorably with equation 01 or 07. 
With the addition of industry dummies, addition al observations 
were deleted because many industries contain only one or two 
firms with no export credits. 
In the full model with 699 firms (equation 12), the 
coefficient of determination is quite high (.904), but only the 
advertising variable is significantly different from zero. This 
is due to severe multicol 1inearity among the explanatory 
variables. Neither the coefficient of S2D nor that of S2, for 
example, are statistically signicant, but in a joint test the two 
* variables are significant at the .01 level. of confidence 
(F=5.38). For this type of regression model an extremely large 
number of observations seem to be required in order to obtain 
precise estimates of the parameters. Glejser et al. had a sample 
of only 970 firms to estimate a similar model 5 the "small" size 
of the sample may account for the multicol 1inearity problems that 
they encountered. 
f > Verticai_^ntegration 
The value-added/output variable has the expected negative 
sign and is highly significant in all specifications of the 
regression model. The more vertically integrated the firm, the 
less the volume of exports. This finding is consistent with the 
hypothesis that the drawback privilege of duty-free importation 
of inputs is most valuable for an exporter that relies heavily on 
outside suppliers for component parts and raw materials. In the 
full model (equation 03 or 06), each additional percentage point 
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Table D-7 
The Derminants of Export Performance in Restricted Samples 
Vari, ab le B®9C®15ign_Cgef f ¿events 
export credit < 
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Table 18 (notes) 
Note: The numbers in parentheses are the standard errors of the 
coefficients. (*> indicates significance at the .05 level 
and (**) at the .01 level. 
a/ Coefficient varies by industry. See appendix tables D-5, D-6 
and D-7. 
b/ An a priori restriction for the coefficient of this variable 
was necessary because of multicol1inearity. 
of production that is incorporated within the firm is associated 
with a one percent fall in exports. 
Firms which produce final consumer goods tend to advertise 
more, and to be less integrated vertically than firms which 
produce capital or intermediate goods. Since the coefficient for 
advertising is positive, whereas that for vertical integration is 
negative, it appears that Brazilian producers demonstrate a 
strong competitive advantage in consumer goods. 
g) Industrial_Concentration 
The .cjp&ff icient of the Herfindahl (H) index has the expected 
positive sign, but is statistical 1 y significant only when 
industry dummies are excluded from the regression equation. As 
was the case with the tariff variable, this may well be the 
result of col 1inearity, with the dummy terms picking up some of 
the effect of market concentration. The coefficient of 1.167 in 
equation 01 implies that, holding other variables constant, 
exports increase by nearly 1.2 percent for each increase of .01 
points in the H index. Does a coefficient of this magnitude 
indicate that concentrâtion is beneficial for export performance? 
The answer is not necessarily, for other things are not constant, 
and there is also a very strong inverse relationship between firm 
size and export performance. 
Suppose, for example, there to be an industry that contains 
ten identical single-plant firms, so that the H index is equal to 
10(1/10)''% or 0.10. Now let the number of firms be reduced to 
nine, with no change in the size of the domestic market Dr„ the 
equality of market shares. The H index increases to 9(1/9) , or 
approximately 0.11, so we would expect an increase of 1.2"/. in 
exports. But the domestic sales of at least one firm must 
increase, and this will have a negative effect on exports of the 
industry. If the domestic sales of the firm which leaves the 
industry are distributed equally among the remaining nine firms, 
the domestic sales of each will increase by approx i matel y 117. and 
exports on this account will fall by more than nine percent, much 
more than the increase attributable to increased concentration. 
One might well argue that the concentrâtion variable is not 
properly specified in the equations of table 17. Most of the 
literature on this topic implies that a positive relationship is 
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expected between industry concentrâtion and export performance 
only in the case of large firms with considerable monopoly power 
in the domestic market. In addition, Auquier <1980) has 
hypothesised that the competitive fringe should also export more, 
the more concentrated the market, because their domestic options 
are preempted by larger rivals. 
These two hypotheses can be tested jointly by adding two 
interaction terms to the regression model: DS25ijHj and 
DS500ijHj. The first variable is equal to the value of the H 
index for the jth industry only if the ith firm of that industry 
reported domestic sales of 25 million cruzeiros or less; 
otherwise the variable is equal to zero. This sales criteria 
applies to 576 firms in our sample. The second interaction term 
takes the value of the H index of the industry corresponding to a 
particular firm only if the firm recorded domestic sales in 
excess of 500 million cruzeiros, which was the case of only 379 
firms in our sample. These two variables thus measure the 
deviation of small and large firms from the coefficient of H 
estimated with data from the entire sample of 3 345 firms. 
Adding the interaction terms to equation 01 
following result: 
produces the 
In (X/DS. .) ij 8.344** <0.800) 
0.912** In <DS. .) 
(0.032) 1 J 
+ 0.509** 
( 0 . 0 6 0 ) 
In(EST. . ) 1 J 
+ 0.399** 1n(K..) + 3.931** ADV. 
(0.055) i J (1.113) 1 J 
0.752** T. + 2.063** SID. 
(0. 115) (0.113) 1J 
- 2.772** SI. . + 0.483** S2D. . + 3.948* S2. . - 3.081** V. . 
(0.347) 1 J (0.096) 1 J <1.589) 1 J <0.243) 1 J 
- 0.496 H. + 1.927* STATE.. + 0.756** LIC.. + 0.576** FOR.. 
(0.508) J (0.759) 1 J (0.180) 1 J (0.104) l j 
+ 3.439** DS25. .H. + 3.694** DS500..H. 
(0.946) 1J J (0.826) 1J J 
R = .337 
It should be noted that the coefficient of Hj becomes negative, 
but is not significantly different from zero, whereas the 
coefficient for the interaction between size and concentrâtion 
exceeds 3.0 and is highly significant. 
Introducing the size-concentration interaction terms into 
the full regression model (equation 03) yields a similar result: 
1 n ( X/DSi j ) = a.D. + b D.ln(DS..) + 0.366** ln(EST..) J J K J iJ (0.059) 1 J 
+ 0.279** 1n(K. .) + 8.598** ADV. 
(0.057) 1J (1.406) iJ 
0.752 T. + 1.696** SID. 
( 0 . 1 0 6 ) 
1 J 
2.045** SI . . + 0.448** S2D, . + 2.843* S2_. 
(0.332) 1 J (0.088) 
_ - 1.116** V. 
1 J (1.455) X J (0.271) 
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- 0.907 H. + 1.371 STATE. . + 0.697** LIC. . + 0.638** FOR. . 
(1.054) J (0.741) l j (0.167) 1 J (0.099) 1 J 
+ 3.884** DS25..H. + 3.385** DS500..H. R 2 = .815 
(1.259) 1 J J (1.225) 1 J J 
The industry dummies (a.) and 139 domestic sales elasticities 
(b^) were calculated but Jare not shown -for reasons of space. 
In sum, the results lend considerable support to the 
proposition that concentrâtion induces greater export performance 
on the part of both large firms and the competitive fringe, while 
for the vast majority of firms market concentration in itself 
bears no relationship to exports. In addition, it should be 
noted that concentrâtion can have a large effect on export 
performance through its effect on the size distribution of firms 
in an industry. This negative effect, though indirect, over-
whelms the direct effects if increased concentration at the firm 
level is associated with increased concentrâtion of production at 
the plant level as well. 
h ) State_0wnershi.gi 
No particular sign was hypothesized for the STATE dummy. It 
is included in the regression first because of interest in the 
behavior of public compared to private enterprise and secondly 
because public ownership may well have an independent effect on 
export performance. As can be seen in table 17, the coefficient 
of this variable is quite large, and is most often statistically 
significant. Ex £Qst, it is tempting to interpret this as 
evidence that public enterprises have more information and a 
wider export horizon that private enterprises, or that they are 
able to sell abroad at a loss with the full knowledge that this 
will be covered by the state or by increased prices for domestic 
sales. Nonetheless, since only eight exporters in our sample are 
under public ownership, it is very possible that this result may 
not be generally applicable to public enterprises operating in 
Brazil's manufacturing sector. 
i ) Forei_qn_Li_ceQses 
The positive and highly significant coefficient of the 
foreign license dummy is consisitent with the thesis that in 
Brazil license agreements with overseas firms are a prerequisite 
for, rather an obstacle to, export success. The estimated 
coefficient varies from 0.7 to 0.9 depending on the 
specifications of the other variables, which implies that exports 
of resident-owned firms with licenses are two to two-and-a-half 
times greater than exports of similar firms operating without 
licensed technology or trademarks. 
j ) E°!I!=i9Q_Qyn§îlî§hiE 
The coefficient of the foreign ownership dummy is similarly 
positive and highly significant. It is interesting to note that 
its magnitude differs little from that of the dummy for license 
agreements. It would thus appear to make no difference in terms 
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of export performance whether foreign firms transfer their 
technology and trademarks through licensing arrangements or 
through direct investment in Brazilian companies. 
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APPENDICES 
A. INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION 
The complete data base for this report consists of 15,041 
firms, which represent nearly 67. of the total number of active 
manufacturing firms in 1978. Exporting firms total 3,562, or 
roughly two-thirds of the total number of exporters in the 
manufacturing sector. Those firms which registered virtually no 
domestic sales were deleted, reducing the sample by 107 to 14,934 
firms. Each firm has been allocated to the industry which 
accounts for the largest proportion of its sales. 
It should be emphasised that this is not a stratified 
sample, for small firms are under-represented. Individual firms 
are not, of course, identified, and to insure confidentiality 
four-digit industries with fewer than six firms were not included 
in the data base. For 179 industries, data are included for all 
firms with reported 1978 sales in excess of two million cruzeiros 
or exports greater than one million cruzeiros, i.e. approximately 
100 and 50 thousand dollars, respectively. 
Table A-l shows the distribution by industry of the entire 
sample and the 3,455 exporters. This table reveals the extraor-
dinary diversity of Brazilian exports: all but nine of the 179 
four-digit industries registered exports in 1978. 
The data have been used to calculate indices of market 
concentration for each of the 179 industries. This repeats the 
earlier work of Braga and Mascolo <1982) with two important 
modifications. First, many firms have a fiscal year which does 
not coincide with the calendar year. The cruzeiro values of 
sales for these firms have been inflated by the industrial whole-
sale price index in order to make the statistics more comparable. 
Secondly, exports have been deleted from total sales in order to 
calculate indices of concentration in the domestic market. It 
has not been possible to take competing imports into account, but 
these are of minor importance in most industries. 
Table A-2 reports the Herfindahl indices of concentration 
for domestic sales, exports and total sales in each industry. 
This index is defined as the sum of the squares of market shares, 
so takes a value between one (a single seller) and zero. As is 
to be expected, export sales tend to be much more concentrated 
than domestic sales; in only 13 industries is the index for 
export sales smaller than that for domestic sales. Most 
surprisingly, however, in 73 industries total sales are actually 
less concentrated than domestic sales. This is strong evidence 
that the largest exporters are not, in general, the largest 
sellers in the domestic market. 
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Table D-2 
Distribution of Firms in the Complete Data Base by Industry 
Code Nymher_of _Fi.rms 
Jotal Exgorters 
14 934 3 455 































Stone, marble, granite 
Crushed rock 
Li mestone 





Processed non-metallic minerals 

















BASIC IRON AND STEEL 
27 Pig iron 
3 Primary iron 
9 Primary iron 
23 Steel plate, 
13 Iron and steel 
23 Forged steel 
8 Steel wire 























BASIC NON-FERROUS METALS 
12 Primary non—ferrous metals 
3 Primary non-ferrous alloys 
6 Non-ferrous metal plates 
1 Pipe and tubes of non-ferrous metals 
8 Forgings of non-ferrous metals 
1 Non-ferrous metal wire 
1 Plated non-ferrous metals 
5 Solder and anodes 


















8 Metallurgy of powders 
14 Metallic structures 
27 Products made of metal bars 
17 Metal stampings 
22 Tanks and boilers 
42 Cutlery, arms, hand tools, etc. 
1 Metal-working, galvanizing 
129 Other metal products n.e.s. 
53 
Code Number_of_Firms 

























































D e s c r i p t i o n 
MACHINERY 
Non-electrical industrial motors 
Heating and plumbing equipment 
Machine tools 
Parts and accessories for ind. machinery 
Agricultural machinery 
Elevators and other commercial machinery 
Office machinery, including electrical 
Domestic appliances 
Clocks and watches 
Tractors and earth-moving equipment 
Machinery and equipment repair 
















material for motor vehicles 
equipment for domestic use 
equip for commerce and ind. 









































Automobile parts, except 
Rebuilding of automobile 
Automobile bodies, except 

















8 Wood structures 
33 PIywood and particleboard 

























































PULP AND PAPER 
34 4 Pulp 
217 44 Paper and cardboard 
335 28 Paper articles 
259 9 Cardboard articles 
9 1 Articles of pressed fibers 
RUBBER 
28 Natural rubber 
33 8 Tires and tubes 
294 1 Tire re-treading 
40 7 Rubber hose and sheets 
22 4 Foam rubber, except mattresses 
268 37 Other rubber articles except clothing or 
footwear 
LEATHER 
278 93 Leather tanning 
7 3 Leather finishing 
97 11 Luggage 
250 25 Other leather goods except clothing or 
footwear 
CHEMICALS 
91 36 Organic and inorganic chemicals n.e.c. 
20 3 Petroleum fuels and oils 
26 10 Basic petrochemicals 
11 3 Grease, other petroleum derivatives 
27 8 Synthetic fibers 
8 4 Explosives 
63 40 Essential oils 
13 5 Concentrated flavors and aromas 
51 15 Insecticides, disinfectants, cleansers 
103 28 Paint and varnish 
62 4 Fertilizers 
169 44 Other chemical products -n.e.c. 
PHARMACEUTICAL 
408 58 Pharmaceutical products 
PERFUMES AND SOAPS 
155 13 Perfumes 
180 13 Soap and detergents 
58 2 Candles 
PLASTICS 
21 6 Plastic sheets 
73 20 Plastic articles for industrial use 
43 10 Plastic articles for domestic use, 
except luggage, shoes or clothing 
14 4 Plastic furniture 
127 15 Plastic packaging 
2360 19 9 Plastic pipe and -fittings 
2399 127 21 Other plastic articles n.e.c. 
TEXTILES 
2410 148 34 Textile -fibers 
2420 484 232 Knits and woven -fabrics 
2430 141 47 Stretch knits, elastic 
2440 35 14 Pleating, embroidery, ribbons 
2450 23 12 Special textiles 
2460 44 10 Finished cloth and yarn 
2499 49 30 Other textile products n.e.c. 
CLOTHING AND FOOTWEAR 
2510 568 78 CIothi ng 
2520 9 Hats 
2530 275 136 Footwear 
2540 55 18 Clothing accessories 
2599 38 6 Other fabric articles n.e.c 
PROCESSED FOOD 
2601 431 15 Coffee and grain processing plants 
2602 64 5 Flour mills 
2603 180 1 Coffee roasting and grinding 
2604 7 7 Instant coffee and tea 
2605 30 4 Maize products, except oils 
2606 16 1 Cassava products 
2609 78 37 Other grain mill products 
2610 67 23 Preserved fruits and vegetables 
2620 207 44 Meatpacking plants 
2621 73 9 Meat products from meatpacking plants 
2622 25 Sausage and meat products not produced 
in meatpacking plants 
2629 8 Meat products n.e.c. 
2630 43 24 Fish and fish products 
2640 122 9 Dairy products, except ice cream 
2651 171 45 Sugar 
2652 12 4 Refined sugar 
2660 54 23 Chocolates and candies 
2670 129 Bakeri es 
2680 101 8 Macaroni, spaghetti and noodles 
2691 72 51 Vegetable oils and lard 
2692 11 3 Ice cream 
2693 11 1 Salt 
2694 9 Baking powder and yeast 
2698 51 3 Prepared animal feeds 






























































































Other tobacco products 
PRINTING AND PUBLISHING 
Newspapers, magasines and books 
Commercial printing 
Other printing n.e.c. 
OTHER MANUFACTURES 
Technical and scientific instruments 
Artificial limbs, wheelchairs 








Brooms and brushes 
Moving pictures 
Toys 
Sporting and athletic goods 
Other manufactured goods n.e.c. 
Source: 1978 data base. 
n.e.c. = not elsewhere classified. 
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Table A-2 
Concentration Indices for Brazilian Industries, 1978. 
Industry .dèci iQä=sbl_ Indices 
Dornestiç_Saies Exports Total_Sa 
NON-METALLIC MINERALS 
1010 . 0653 . 3086 .0601 
1011 . 1844 « « a . 1844 
1020 . 1759 • • « . 1759 
1030 . 1661 1.0000 . 1660 
1040 . 0254 .0981 .0253 
1050 . 0555 . 7932 .0550 
1060 .1082 . 2518 . 1065 
1070 . 1209 .2158 .1190 
1080 . 0648 .2621 .0664 
1099 . 1672 .7821 . 1952 
BASIC IRON AND STEEL 
1101 .0991 . 2280 .1176 
1102 . 6660 . 5132 .6158 
1103 . 1143 . 1742 . 1107 
1104 . 1479 . 1936 . 1480 
1105 .2157 . 1939 .2050 
1106 .0695 .4390 .0732 
1107 . 1842 .4174 . 1882 
1109 . 2359 .5439 a 2^65 
BASIC NON-FERROUS METALS 
1111 . 1283 .2347 . 1230 
1112 .2478 .9761 .2338 
1113 .2621 .5198 .2609 
1114 .3155 1.0000 .3154 
1115 .1175 .3951 . 1190 
1116 .6378 1.0000 .6382 
1117 .3075 1.0000 .3076 
1118 .2248 ' . 4-292 . 2400 
1119 .2111 .9485 .2135 
METAL PRODUCTS 
1120 . 1136 .2243 . 1123 
1130 . 0889 .5422 . 1018 
1140 .0465 .2310 . 0473 
1150 . 0573 . 1623 .0571 
1160 . 0788 . 1181 .0764 
1170 .0481 . 0789 .0465 
1180 .0712 1.0000 .0712 
1199 .0110 . 0300 .0110 
industry 
M» «M M» M» «M» M» — -bi=£Ì ÎDûûâbl, 
Exports 
MACHINERY 
1210 .2492 .3703 
1220 .0170 . 1420 
1231 . 0303 . 1048 
1232 . 0358 . 3711 
1240 . 0900 .2676 
1251 . 0269 . 0887 
1253 .4391 .4134 
1254 . 1729 .2714 
1260 . 2058 .9870 
1270 . 1246 . 2500 
1280 . 3225 .7219 















1310 . 1382 .1118 . 1291 
1320 . 02B1 . 0995 .0279 
1330 .4266 .7787 . 4358 
1340 .2450 .5798 .2556 
1351 . 1689 .7010 . 1752 
1352 . 1230 . 3312 . 1358 
1353 .2940 .8373 .3023 
1370 .0906 . 2870 . 0897 
1380 .0870 .2387 . 0837 
1390 . 3377 1.0000 . 3371 
TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT 
1411 .1761 .3146 .1700 
1413 . 3450 1.0000 . 3607 
1421 .2393 .4209 .2465 
1432 . 1971 . 1677 . 1888 
1433 .0212 .0728 .0219 
1434 .0890 .7065 .0900 
1440 . 0536 . 3993 .0615 
1450 . 1527 .4821 . 1563 
1472 .2472 1.0000 m 2265 
1480 .2405 .5640 .2268 
1490 . 2649 1.0000 .2647 
WOOD 
1510 .0112 .0412 .0122 
1520 . 0322 .4797 . 0335 
1530 . 1017 . 1851 . 1078 
1550 . 0243 . 1065 . 0242 
FURNITURE 
1610 .0079 . 1634 . 0082 
1620 . 0401 . 1445 . 0400 
1630 . 1299 . 3541 . 1309 
1699 . 1024 . 9094 . 1278 
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2110 0359 0871 .0362 











































Industry H e r f i n d a h i c e s 
















































2530 0138 .0267 .0119 
PROCESSED FOOD 
2601 . 0069 .4153 .0082 
2602 .0418 .9179 . 0433 
2603 .0185 1.0000 .0183 
2604 .2238 . 2097 . 2009 
2605 .5129 .3634 . 4971 
2606 . 1045 1.0000 . 1042 
2609 .2872 .2112 .2289 
2610 . 1667 . 178B . 1650 
2620 .0152 . 1066 .0161 
2621 . 0678 . 2698 .0757 
2622 .0145 • • a .0145 
2629 . 2002 • • • . 2002 
2630 .0655 . 1607 .0580 
2640 . 1413 .7779 . 1292 
2651 .0115 . 0658 .0108 
2652 .2794 .5512 . 2536 
2660 .0614 .2886 . 0643 
2670 .0761 • m m . 0761 
2680 .0404 .7484 .0404 
2691 . 0644 .0746 .0561 
2692 .8191 . 7244 . 8033 
2693 . 1662 1.0000 . 1590 
2694 . 2039 « « B . 2039 
2698 . 1032 . 6242 . 1031 
2699 . 0453 .3145 . 0895 
BEVERAGES 
2710 . 0404 .3155 . 0404 
2720 . 0398 . 123B . 0397 
2730 . 1577 .5133 . 1586 
2741 . 0498 . 4643 .0516 
2742 . 1570 m • • . 1570 
2750 . 1812 1.0000 . 2064 
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Industry Herf indahl_Indiçes 
Dornest iç_Bal_ es Exports Tgta:i_Sales 
TOBACCO 
2810 . 1891 .3094 .2514 
2820 .5837 .8051 . 5987 
2830 .6200 .5159 .5917 
2899 . 1475 .2193 . 1623 
PRINTING 
2910 . 0491 .3148 . 0494 
2920 . 0218 .9276 . 022B 
2999 . 0359 1.0000 .0360 
OTHER MANUFACTURES 
3000 . 1106 . 3524 .1106 
3011 . 8402 1.0000 .8465 
3012 . 0816 .2610 .0857 
3021 . 8550 .9766 .8683 
3023 . 0689 .4601 . 0752 
3031 .3964 . 2093 . 1686 
3032 . 1521 . 3590 . 1533 
3033 . 1962 .7329 . 1895 
3041 . 2614 .4350 .2670 
3042 .2523 .8865 .2670 
3050 .2261 . 3942 .2293 
3060 . 1715 m m m . 1715 
3070 . 3906 . 7516 . 4042 
3080 . 1469 . 3334 . 1460 
3099 .0226 .4567 . 0385 
Source: 197B data base. 
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B. STATISTICAL APPENDIX TO CHAPTER III 
Table B-l 
Definition of Subsectors 
Subsector Industry_Codes 
Non-metallic minerals 10 
Basic iron and steel 110 
Basic non-ferrous 111 
Metal products 112-119 
Machinery 12 
Electrical equipment 13 
Transport equipment 14 
Wood 15 
Furniture 16 
Pulp and paper 17 
Rubber products 18 
Leather 19 
Chemicals 20 





Food and tobacco 26-28 
Printing 29 
Other manufactures 30 
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Table D-2 
Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficients between Volume of Exports 
and Rate of Fiscal Subsidy, by Industry 
i^n_bet ween Ex pgr ts_and 
Number of Total Export Income Tax 
Industry Firms SybsidyjS)_ ÇreditlSl1 Exemption 
TOTAL 3 345 .202 . 195 . 176 
NON-METALLIC MINERALS 
1010 8 NS NS NS 
1040 40 .481 .358 .330 
1050 .5 NS NS NS 
1060 11 NS NS NS 
1070 21 . 579 .472 .541 
1080 8 NS NS NS 
1099 9 NS NS NS 
BASIC IRON AND STEEL 
1101 27 NS NS NS 
1102 3 NS NS NS 
1103 9 NS NS NS 
1104 23 NS NS NS 
1105 13 NS NS NS 
1106 23 .591 .615 NS 
1107 7 NS NS NS 
1109 3 NS NS NS 
BASIC NON-FERROUS METALS 
1111 12 NS NS NS 
1112 3 NS NS NS 
1113 6 NS NS NS 
1114-1117 11 NS NS NS 
1118-1119 7 NS NS NS 
METAL PRODUCTS 
1120 8 NS NS NS 
1130 14 NS NS NS 
1140 27 NS NS NS 
1150 17 . 536 .521 .504 
1160 22 NS NS NS 
1170 42 .542 .549 .528 
1180,1199 130 . 182 NS . 185 
MACHINERY 
1210 8 . 738 NS NS 
1220 77 . 304 NS .376 
1231 74 NS NS NS 
1232 23 . 460 .432 .510 
1240 66 . 405 .411 NS 




Number of Total Export Income Tax 



















































































































































































Bs*Q^_Correl_at i_on_.be t ween Exgorts_and 
Number of Total Export Income Tax 
Industry F:L rms SybsidyiS). Credi tiSl). ExemptignjtS^). 
CHEMICALS 
2000 36 NS NS NS 
2011 3 NS NS NS 
2012 10 NS NS NS 
2017 3 NS NS NS 
2020 8 NS NS NS 
2031 4 NS NS NS 
2040 39 NS NS .373 
2050 5 NS NS NS 
2060 15 NS NS .600 
2070 28 .453 NS .620 
2080 3 NS NS NS 
2099 43 .344 NS .405 
PHARMACEUTICAL, COSMETICS AND SOAPS 
2110 58 . 386 .379 .349 
2210 13 NS NS NS 
2220,2230 15 NS NS NS 
PLASTICS 
2310 6 NS NS NS 
2320 20 NS NS NS 
2330 10 . 784 NS . 725 
2340 4 NS NS NS 
2350 14 NS NS NS 
2360 9 NS NS NS 
2399 21 NS NS NS 
TEXTILES 
2410 32 NS NS . 403 
2420 232 .228 . 165 . 199 
2430 47 NS NS NS 
2440 14 NS NS NS 
2450 12 NS NS NS 
2460 10 NS NS NS 
2499 30 NS NS NS 
CLOTHING 
2510,2520 80 NS NS .380 
2540 18 . 543 .491 .702 
2599 6 NS NS NS 
FOOTWEAR 
2530 136 . 538 .377 . 314 
FOOD 
2601 8 NS NS NS 
2602 4 NS .949 NS 
2603,2604 8 . 833 NS .810 
2605,2606 5 NS NS NS 





























Total Export Income Tax 






















































































































Note: NS = not significantly different from zero at the five per 
cent level of confidence in a two-tailed test. 
51 = ratio of export credit (credito premio) to subsidy-
inclusive export revenue. 
52 = ratio of subsidy equivalent of the income tax 
reduction to subsidy-inclusive export revenue. 
S = SI +• S2. 
Source: 1978 data base. 
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C. STATISTICAL APPENDIX TO CHAPTER IV 
Table C-l 
Mean Values by Subsector of Variables in Logit Regression 
InS lnK ADV InHK InPHK 
TOTAL 16. 984 12. 154 0. 007 10. 959 11. 560 
nonexporters 16. 418 12. 077 0. 006 10. 86B 11. 448 
exporters 18. 521 12. 365 0. 010 11. 207 11. 864 
Non-metallic minerals 17. 288 12. 070 0. 006 10. 936 11. 471 
nonexporters 16. 812 12. 018 0. 005 10. 875 11. 374 
exporters 18. 638 12. 216 0. 010 11. 111 11. 744 
Basic iron and steel 19. 258 12. 287 0. 004 11. 218 11. 440 
nonexporters 17. 565 12. 185 0. 002 11. 170 11. 113 
exporters 19. 208 12. 426 0. 007 11. 282 11. 885 
Basic non-ferrous 17. 546 12. 351 0. 004 11. 146 11. 849 
nonexporters 17. 067 12. 287 0. 003 11. 065 11. 763 
exporters 19. 108 12. 562 0. 005 11. 408 12. 129 
Metal products 17. 061 12. 170 0. 005 11. 067 11. 581 
nonexporters 16. 575 12. 125 0. 004 10. 997 11. 508 
exporters 18. 448 12. 297 0. 008 11. 267 11. 787 
Machi nery 17. 414 12. 516 0. 009 11. 451 11. 840 
nonexporters 16. 677 12. 474 0. 007 11. 357 11. 713 
exporters 18. 303 12. 566 0. 011 11. 564 11. 992 
Electrical equipment 17. 814 12. 389 0. 009 11. 270 11. 782 
nonexporters 17. 068 12. 356 0. 008 11. 190 11. 699 
exporters 18. 749 12. 431 0. 011 11. 370 11. 886 
Transport equipment 18. 056 12. 265 0. 006 11. 261 U . 627 
nonexporters 17. 181 12. 187 0. 005 11. 182 11. 535 
exporters 18. 946 12. 343 0. 007 11. 342 11. 721 
Wood 16. 439 11. 864 0. 003 10. 590 11. 327 
nonexporters 15. 967 11. 804 0. 002 10. 555 11. 232 
exporters 18. 008 12. 065 0. 006 10. 708 11. 640 
Furni ture 16. 505 11. 843 0. 007 10. 741 11. 319 
nonexporters 16. 195 11. 794 0. 006 10. 703 11. 250 
exporters 17. 970 12. 074 0. 011 10. 919 11. 644 
Pulp and paper 16. 229 11. 873 0. 003 10. 749 11. 220 
nonexporters 15. 941 11. 807 0. 002 10. 683 11. 131 
exporters 18. 678 12. 436 0. 005 11. 306 11. 971 
Rubber products 15. 807 12. 016 0. 005 10. 798 11. 379 
nonexporters 15. 381 11. 971 0. 005 10. 727 11. 302 
exporters 18. 260 12. 275 0. 004 11. 209 11. 815 
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Source: 1978 data base. 
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Table D-2 
Estimated Regression Coefficients of the Subsector 
Dummy Variables 
Subsector B®9Cf=ssign Model 
02 03 05 06 
Non-metallic minerals -4.167 -14. 500 -3.953 — 4. 841 
(0.306) (1. 472) (0.304) 1. 538) 
Basic iron and steel -3.690 -14. 006 -3.404 - 4. 346 
(0.315) (1. 465) (0.314) 1. 538) 
Basic non-ferrous -4.227 -14. 462 -4.019 - 4. 840 
(0.347) (1. 523) (0.346) 1. 593) 
Metal products -3.843 -14. 062 -3.577 - 4. 406 
(0.287) (1. 425) (0.285) 1. 499) 
Machi nery -2.825 -13. 122 -2.487 - 3. 450 
(0.287) (1. 405) (0.287) 1. 488) 
Electrical equipment -3.328 -13. 629 -3.067 - - r 962 
(0.296) (1. 424) (0.294) 1. 498) 
Transport equipment -3.248 -13. 480 -2.893 - 3. 784 
(0.302) (1. 428) (0.302) 1. 507) 
Wood -3.690 -13. 607 -3.626 - 3. 983 
(0.292) (1. 406) (0.288) 1. 464) 
Furni ture -4.207 -14. 215 -4.013 - 4. 562 
(0.299) (1. 428) (0.297) 1. 493) 
Pulp and paper -4.777 -14. 783 -4.496 - 5. 097 
(0.299) (1. 462) (0.297) 1. 535) 
Rubber products -3.935 -13. 883 -3.722 - 4. 224 
(0.318) (1. 456) (0.316) 1. 526) 
Leather -3.229 -12. 814- -3.092 - 3. 176 
(0.285) (1. 363) (0.282) 1. 427) 
Chemi cals -3.'624 -14. 400 -3.597 - 4. 797 
(0.310) (1. 4-90) (0.304) 1. 551) 
Pharmaceutical, cosmetics -4.668 -15. 117 -4.529 - 5. 477 
(0.309) (1. 508) (0.304) 1. 575) 
PIastics -4.294 -14. 549 -4.091 4. 888 
(0.306) (1. 460) (0.304) 1. 526) 
Textiles -3.412 -13. 586 -3.280 - 3. 959 
(0.286) (1. 413) (0.282) 1. 476) 
CIothing -4.347 -14. 406 -4.153 - 4. 743 
(0.293) (1. 426) (0.290) 1. 492) 
Footwear -2.928 -2.609 
(0.298) (0.297) 
Food and tobacco -4.480 -14. 935 -4.438 - 5. 330 
(0.286) (1. 471 ) (0.281) 1. 531) 
F'ri nting -5.433 -15. 535 -5.101 - 5. 867 
(0.384) (1. 628) (0.383) 1. 699) 
Other manufactures -3.070 -13. 307 -2.936 - .3. 688 
(0.303) (1. 426) (0.299) 1. 491) 
Note: The statistics in parentheses are the asymptotic standard 
errors of the coefficients. All coefficients are significantly 
different from zero at the .01 level of confidence. 
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A. STATISTICAL APPENDIX TO CHAPTER V 
Table D-l 
Concentration Indices, Implicit Tariff Protection and 











1010 8 .0653 -15.5 D1 
1040 40 . 0254 -27.5 D2 
1050 5 .0555 -34. 1 D3 
1060 11 . 1082 -34. 1 D4 
1070 21 . 1209 19.5 D5 
1080 8 .0648 -27.5 D6 










































BASIC NON-FERROUS METALS 




























































































Number o-f Her-f i ndahl Impli ci t Indusl 
Industry Exporters Index _Dumm; 
MACHINERY 
1210 8 .2492 17. 1 D28 
1220 77 .0170 29.5 D29 
1231 74 . 0303 85. 1 D30 
1232 23 . 0358 85. 1 D31 
1240 66 .0900 -18.3 D32 
1251 93 . 0269 29.5 D33 
1253 4 .4391 -18. 3 D34 
1254 9 . 1729 -5.8 D35 
1260 2 .2058 -5. 8 D35 
1270 16 . 1246 -47.8 D36 
1280 2 . 3225 29.5 D37 
1299 101 . 0202 29.5 D37 
ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT 
1310 35 . 1382 -11.3 D38 
1320 39 . 0281 52.9 D39 
1330 2 . 4266 52. 9 D39 
1340 20 .2450 52.9 D40 
1351 17 .1689 34. 7 D41 
1352 60 . 1230 34.7 D42 
1353 2 .2940 34.7 D42 
1370 25 . 0906 96.4 D43 
1380 32 . 0870 63.2 D44 
TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT 
1411 9 . 1761 19.6 D45 
1421 7 .2393 -6. 4 D46 
1432 15 . 1971 -6.4 D47 
1433 122 .0212 —23. 2 D4B 
1434 3 . 0890 -15. 5 D49 
1440 19 . 0536 -15.5 D50 
1450 9 . 1527 -15. 5 D51 
WOOD 
1510 65 .0112 33. 6 D52 
1520 7 . 0322 -8.9 D53 
1530 33 . 1017 33. 6 D54 
1550 17 . 0243 -23. 1 D55 
FURNITURE 
1610 57 . 0079 20.0 D56 
1620 16 .0401 20.0 D57 
1630 5 . 1299 20.0 D58 
1699 6 . 1024 20.0 D59 
PULP AND PAPER 
1710 4 . 5113 -37. 7 D60 
1720 44 .0260 -9.0 D61 
1730 27 .0374 -32. 4 D62 
1740 9 .0188 -32.4 D63 
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Number of Herfindahl Implicit Industry 
industry Ex gor ter s Jndex I®ti£í_í2-1 _Pymmy 
OTHER MANUFACTURES 
3000 10 . 1106 73. 9 D128 
3011 1 . 8402 73.9 D129 
3012 17 .0816 73. 9 D129 
3021 2 . 8550 73.9 D130 
3023 9 . 0689 73. 9 D130 
3031 9 .3964 73. 9 D131 
3032 5 . 1521 73.9 D132 
3033 4 . 1962 73.9 D133 
3041 4 . 2614 73. 9 D134 
3042 4 . 2523 73.9 D135 
3050 5 . 2261 73.9 D136 
3070 6 .3906 73.9 D137 
3080 6 . 1469 73.9 D138 
3099 56 . 0226 73. 9 D139 
Source: 1978 data base and W.G. Tyler, "Politica comercial e 
industrial no Brasil: uma analise sob a ótica de 
protecao efetiva para vendas no mercado domestico, 




Estimated Regression Coefficients of the Industry Dummy Terms 
in Equations 02 and 05 
Eguatign_02 §?J3y*§£ion_05 
Variable f ®tandard_error £oef £ ici. ent standard_i 
D1 7.219** 1. 023 9.055** 1.040 
D2 6.354** 0. 835 8.134** 0.859 
D3 6.629** 1. 174 8.531** 1. 180 
D4 6.424** 0. 959 8.231** 0.971 
D5 6.344** 0. 894 B.145** 0.920 
D6 6.989** 1. 032 8.888** 1.054 
D7 5.834**. 1.016 7.676** 1.038 
D8 8.486** 0. 849 10.329** 0.859 
D9 7.425** 1. 507 9.198** 1.536 
D10 8.872** 1.027 10.733** 1.037 
D U 7.146** 0.923 8.982** 0.944 
0.12 6.922** 0. 980 8.776** 1.002 
Dl 3 6.312** 0.873 8.099** 0.905 
D14 5.975** 1. 102 7.842** 1. 120 
D15 6.237** 1. 371 8.108** 1.391 
D16 7.673** 0 a 979 9.541** 0. 989 
D17 6.876** 1. 357 8.741** 1.370 
D18 4.253** 1.127 6.094** 1. 152 
D19 4.563** 0. 986 6.380** 1.015 
D20 6.722** 1. 078 8.560** 1.095 
D21 6.452** 1. 032 8.272** 1.054 
D22 6.823** 0.948 8.656** 0.966 
D23 6.255** 0. 869 8.069** 0.892 
D24 5.813** 0. 898 7.579** 0.922 
D25 7.243** 0.8B6 9.063** 0.910 
D26 7.289** 0. 832 9.071** 0.858 
D27 5.80S** 0.802 7.619** 0.827 
D28 6.575** 1. 069 8.415** 1.094 
D29 6.655** 0.822 8.494** 0.849 
D30 7.265** 0.827 9.115** 0.859 
D31 6.354** 0.881 8.145** 0.908 
D32 6.335** 0.821 8.156** 0.845 
D33 6.752** 0.811 8.577** 0.845 
D34 7.628** 1.319 9.549** 1.346 
D35 7.446** 0.981 9.237** 0.995 
D36 7.244** 0.938 9.118** 0.959 
D37 6.627** 0. 815 8.466** 0.845 
D38 7.171** 0. 862 9.01S** 0.890 
D39 6.081** 0. 845 7.876** 0.869 
D40 6.196** 0.911 7.957** 0.942 
D41 6.407** 0. 922 8.168** 0.943 
D42 6.331** 0. 830 8.141** 0.859 
D43 6.894** 0. 878 8.741** 0.900 
D44 6.594** 0.862 8.376** 0.886 
D45 9.476** 1.048 11.352** 1.056 
D46 7.824** 1. 110 9.643** 1. 133 
D47 9.175** 0.958 11.207** 0.991 
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: iguatign_02 Eguat ign_05 
Variable coeff^cient standard_err.gr ggeffi.ci.ent standar d_err or 
D48 5.937** 0. 803 7.750** 0.830 
D49 6.399** 1.351 8.302** 1.369 
D50 6.385** 0. 896 8.207** 0.923 
D51 6.021** 1.012 7.829** 1.029 
D52 8.149** 0.799 9.951** 0.803 
D53 5.797** 1 . 039 7.552** 1. 052 
D54 7.628** 0.839 9.380** 0.855 
D55 6.840** 0. 882 8.619** 0.897 
D56 5.875** 0.806 7.637** 0.824 
D57 5.355** 0. 917 7.158** 0.936 
D58 5.593** 1. 150 7.397** 1. 158 
D59 6.655** 1. 087 8.398** 1. 100 
D60 8.215** 1. 328 10.072** 1. 352 
D61 6.053** 0.836 7.865** 0. S56 
D62 5.127** O. 862 6.972** 0. 884 
D63 5.642** 1. 002 7.556** 1.011 
D64 6.365** 1 . 080 8.221** 1. 100 
D65 5.711** 1. 057 7.526** 1.079 
D66 4.187** 1. 220 6.014** 1. 232 
D67 5.722** 0.839 7.541** 0.865 
D68 7.186** 0. 783 8.987** 0. 794 
D69 6.649** 0.948 8.337** 0. 966 
D70 6.884** 0.837 8.623** 0.860 
D71 6.693** 0.868 8.617** 0. 885 
D72 6.395** 1. 694 8.426** 1. 719 
D73 5.814** 1. 043 7.764** 1. 058 
D74 5.682** 1.486 7.611** 1. 493 
D75 6.079** 1.069 7.940** 1. 085 
D76 8.530** 1 .249 10.328** 1. 263 
D77 8.627** 0.834 10.540** 0. 826 
D78 7.685** 1.212 9.575** 1. 235 
D79 5.384** 0.944 7.220** 0.957 
D80 5.135** 0.879 6.973** 0. 894 
D81 7.420** 1. 370 9.366** 1. 378 
D82 6.119** 0. 853 7.948** 0.874 
D83 6.169** 0.844 7.973** 0. 869 
D84 5.510** 0.950 7.311** 0.968 
D85 6.219** 0.934 8.001** 0.945 
D86 6.288** 1 . 130 8.129** 1. 153 
D87 5.600** 0. 886 7.472** 0.909 
D88 5.336** 0.994 7.129** 1.002 
D89 5.519** 1.220 7.288** 1.238 
D90 5.102** 0.934 6.922** 0.949 
D91 4.624** 1. 029 6.457** 1.049 
D92 5.695** 0.883 7.483** 0. 898 
D93 7.428** 0. 846 9.256** 0.853 
D94 7.407** 0. 789 9.196** 0.805 
D95 6.755** 0.818 8.509** 0. 837 
D96 5.668** 0.920 7.417** 0 . 939 
D97 6.834** 0.973 8.638** 0.990 
D98 7.823** 0.978 9.587** 0.993 
D99 6.929** 0.864 8.624** 0. 885 
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^9y=itioQ_Q2 Eguat i_on_05 
Variable £L2£f f i ci ent coefficient standar 
D100 6. 185«-* 0.796 7.957** 0.816 
D101 8.169** 0. 749 9.879** 0.777 
D102 6.811** 0.873 8.571** 0.891 
D103 6.899** 1. 084 8.672** 1.095 
D104 8.487** 1. 052 10.445** 1.058 
D105 5.494** 1. 219 7.303** 1.231 
D106 10.996** 1. 060 12.967** 1.070 
D107 7.798** 1.222 9.6IB** 1.227 
DIOS 8.876** 0.364 10.654** 0.871 
DI 09 6.972** 0.873 8.720** 0.885 
D U O 8.168** 0. 857 10.001** 0.871 
Dill 9.173** 1. 004 10.910** 1.014 
D112 8.470** 0.875 10.219** 0.891 
D113 7.604** 1.019 9.343** 1.032 
D114 9.948** 0.895 11.914** 0.908 
D115 6.720** 0. 867 B„503** 0. 885 
D116 4.498** 1. 090 6.278** 1. 106 
D117 9.540** 0.852 11.416** 0.845 
D118 5.500** 1.551 7.209** 1.573 
D119 3.845** 1.346 5.722** 1.365 
D120 8.506** 0. 883 10.335** 0. 890 
D121 CT "¡f EJJ* o y « J « .ais.'1 ü « " " 1. 089 7.063** 1.081 
D122 5.291** 0. 929 7.146** 0.935 
D123 5.990** 1. 365 7.811** 1.381 
D124 6.400** 1. 090 8.222** 1. 105 
D125 8.046** 1.082 10.087** 1 . 110 
D126 5.630** 1.051 7.470** 1.077 
D127 5.157** 1.010 6.978** 1. 029 
D128 6.415** 0. 979 8.160** 1. 005 
D129 6.842** 0.910 8.705** 0.937 
D130 6.562** 0.980 8.325** 0.999 
D131 8.362** 1. 083 10.285** 1.078 
D132 6.795** 1. 181 8.623** 1. 194 
D133 6.280** 1.234 8.057** 1.261 
D134 7.522** 1. 253 9.286** 1.272 
D135 6.713** 1.295 8.639** 1. 308 
D136 6.961** 1. 160 8.688** 1. 177 
D137 6.397** 1. 159 8.129** 1. 177 
D13S 7.181** 1. 088 8.905** 1.106 
D139 7.116** 0.814 8.885** 0. 833 
Note: All coefficients are statistically significant at the .01 
1evel. 
Table D-3 
Esti mated Regressi on Coe-f i i ci ents o-f the Industry Dummy Teri 
in Equations 03 and 06 
Eguatign_03 Eguati_on_06 
Vari.ab.le coefficient standard_error coefficient standard_; 
Dl 37.079** 10.072 39.318** 10.072 
D2 10.415* 5.036 11.690* 5.050 
D3 32.244 58.746 30.304 58.798 
D4 22.040** 3.996 23.709** 3.996 
D5 3. 533 4.930 5.379 4. 936 
D6 15.366 8. 169 17.374* 8. 185 
D7 3.827 6.071 5.431 6.077 
D8 -0.436 6.945 0.367 6.955 
D9 —3.423 8.676 -1.886 8.692 
D10 -0.865 7. 173 0.649 7. 177 
Dil -10.361 5.514 -8.620 5.534 
D12 -10.734 8.464 -8.964 8.474 
D13 -6.365 5.456 -4.683 5.467 
Dl 4 -17.317 14.022 -15.010 14.033 
D15 17.453 17.914 19.253 17.929 
D16 13.578 7. 305 15.183* 7.323 
D17 28.793** 7. 113 30.785** 7. 127 
D18 24.531* 11.653 25.834* 11.674 
Dl 9 1.115 9.461 3. 119 9.477 
D20 4.592 14.039 5. 877 14.050 
D21 17.547 13.509 18.666 13.519 
D22 -4.657 5. 043 -3.640 5. 054 
D23 3. 372 5.516 5. 133 5« 
D24 5.916 6.299 7.061 6. 308 
D25 15.700** 4.651 " 17.571** 4. 651 
D26 0.928 4.296 2.884 4. 320 
D27 3. 327 2. 701 4.901 2. 724 
D28 4.540 11.381 6.046 11.404 
D29 9.962* 3.971 12.019** 3.975 
D30 2.226 3. 896 4. 802 3.923 
D31 -1.528 7.638 -0.431 7. 648 
D32 -4.313 3. 186 -2.836 3. 199 
D33 1.263 2.711 2.898 2.735 
D34 3. 508 10.852 4. 171 10.864 
D35 -2.297 6.227 -0.394 6. 223 
D36 -5.211 6. 054 -3.223 6. 067 
D37 3.208 2.904 4.976 2. 918 
D3S -1.518 4.556 0. 144 4.564 
D39 2.429 5. 816 4. 181 5.839 
D40 3.934 4. 996 5. 441 5.001 
D41 -5.249 5.566 -3.964 5.582 
D42 1.077 3. 197 3. 112 3.215 
D43 10.807** 4. 170 14.533** 4. 295 
D44 -6.409 4. 270 -4.759 4. 289 
D4S 9. 715 6. 387 11.378 6. 394 
D46 -12.616 9. 261 -10.790 9.273 
D47 -5.428 3. 811 -2.679 3. 850 
Eguat i_on_03 i gn_06 
Variable coefficient standard error coefficient standard error 
D4S -2.591 2.368 -0.875 2. 367 
D49 -39.677 76.748 -38.696 76.847 
D50 10.662 6.549 12.412 6.554 
051 -12.476 7.775 -10.763 7. 786 
D52 6.059* 3.053 8.618** 3.068 
D53 -21.941 25.162 -20.806 25.186 
D54 15.406** 4. 197 16.577** 4. 196 
D55 9.642 9.515 11.557 9. 519 
D56 12.069** 3.273 13.542** 3.281 
D57 10.987 10.962 12.383 10.964 
D58 2.884 14.630 4.851 14.635 
D59 -18.281 14.589 -16.502 14.603 
D60 28.144 15.121 29.465 15.144 
D61 9.692** 3. 634 11.079** 3.641 
D62 2.442 3.248 4. 326 3.244 
D63 5.478 12.121 9.234 12.098 
D64 -3.878 7.054 -2.385 7.067 
D65 13.914 12.985 15.487 13.004 
D66 18.779 16.978 19.872 16.998 
D67 7.008 4.743 8.635 4.745 
D68 7.765* 3.040 10.146** 3.052 
D69 -5.940 5.261 -5.008 5.265 
D70 1.786 4.215 3.251 4.225 
D71 17.690** 2.925 19.705** 2. 922 
D72 -10.551 8. 134 -8.456 8. 177 
D73 35.255** 12.075 35.960** 12.087 
D74 12.809 8. 823 13.605 8.845 
D75 6.023 5.952 7.904 5.980 
D76 11.008 19.254 12.002 19.270 
D77 10.135** 2.594 11.842** 2.619 
D7B 23.461* 10.674 25.036* 10.677 
D79 2. 331 5. 479 3.931 5.477 
DSO 0.679 5.974 2.406 5.979 
DS1 8.064 4.431 9.897* 4.448 
D82 13.145** 4. 027 14.660** 4.040 
D83 -3.230 3. 179 -1.837 3. 186 
D84 8. 605 4.706 10.262* 4.725 
D85 6.474 3. 850 7.811* 3. 848 
D86 8.266 11.744 9. 861 11.758 
D87 -1.572 5.968 2.549 6.028 
D88 -1.260 7.071 0. 520 7.068 
DS9 -4.758 19.964 -3.462 19.985 
D90 5.959 9.670 7. 623 9.669 
D91 -12.255 8. 299 -10.268 8.310 
D92 0.637 5.942 2.631 5.951 
D93 19.326** 4.042 20.881** 4.032 
D94 6.587** 1.955 8.460** 1.950 
D95 9.123* 4.077 10.852** 4.086 
D96 -12.675 11.268 -10.764 11.285 
D97 -5.339 8.368 -2.998 8.364 
D98 4. 181 9. 834 5.816 9.846 
D99 -2.687 5.028 -1.088 5.036 
SO 
Eguati on_03 §9y§ti9Q_Q£? 
Variable coefficient standard_error coefficient standard_errgr 
D100 3.370 2.873 5. 486 2. 880 
D101 15.461** 1.566 17.134** 1.599 
D102 21.695** 5.051 23.558** 5.051 
D103 -9.477 16.199 -7.154 16.215 
D104 9.516 10.292 11.743 10.303 
D105 -2.582 11.912 -1.405 11.925 
D106 6.000 15.344 6.975 15.381 
D107 9. 124 8. 517 10.136 8.526 
D10S 13.184** 2. 325 14.771** 2. 327 
D109 13.083** 4.211 14.619** 4.214 
D U O 17.832** 4.605 19.608** 4.609 
Dill 5.511 6.867 7.014 6. 877 
D112 11.785* 5. 593 13.678* 5. 593 
D113 18.862** 4.544 20.419** 4.559 
D114 22.203** 4. 942 24.713** 4. 953 
D115 1.304 6.412 2.857 6. 414 
D116 0. 124 14.525 1. 193 14.538 
D117 7.412 4.224 8.913* 4.218 
D118 29.406* 12.542 30.889* 12.553 
D119 47.343 51.036 52.861 51.088 
D120 13.907* 5. 522 15.270** 5.531 
D121 9.402 10.420 10.858 10.430 
D122 18.305** 4.425 19.993** 4.434 
D123 -7.587 69.520 -6.339 0 505 
D124 5. 953 7. 750 7.062 7.762 
D125 8.130* 3.867 9.355* 3. 853 
D126 -14.884 10.542 -13.587 10.550 
D127 5.519 9. 803 7. 063 9. 808 
D128 -5.701 9. 518 -3.766 9. 529 
D129 -11.997 7.960 -10.309 7.966 
D130 -8.036 8.350 -6.946 8. 373 
D131 11.023 6. 667 13.801* 6.659 
D132 -32.176* 13.476 -30.522* 13.495 
D133 34.627 19.311 vl«7 a ¿68 19.344 
D134 -3.587 30.805 -1.132 30.835 
D13S »21.708 24.836 -19.922 24.968 
D136 2.675 12.464 4.069 12.472 
D137 -9.519 9.911 -7.899 9.920 
D138 13.004 43.748 15.960 43.793 
D139 12.380** 2. 291 14.283** 2.299 
Note: (*> indicates significance at the .05 level of confidence 
and <**) at the .01 level. 
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Table D-7 
Estimated Regression Coefficients of the Industry-Domestic Sales 
Interaction Terms in Equations 03 and 06 
Variable Eguat i gn_03 
f r. , standard coefflcient error 
Eguatign_06 


































































































































































































r r. . standard coetflcient error 
Eguatign_06 












































































































































































Vari.abl.e Eguat i_on_03 











































































































































































1nDS*Dl01 •1. 238** 0.087 -1.229** 0.087 
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Variable iiguat ion_03 
,r. , standard coefflcient error 
Eguat i_on_06 






















































































































































































Note: <*) indicates significance at the .05 level of confidence 
and (**) at the .01 level. 
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Table D-7 
Estimated Regression Coefficients of the Industry Dummy Terr 
in Equations 08 and 11 
Eguat ion_08 Eg ua tion_ll 
Var i able coefficient standard error coeff i ci ent standard t 
D1 6.779** 1.021 10.326** 1.871 
D2 5.879** 0.836 8.184** 1. 728 
D3 6.212** 1. 169 
D4 6.006** 0. 958 10.628** 1.795 
D5 5.881** 0.895 8.860** 1.789 
D6 6.553** 1. 029 11.166** 1.952 
D7 5.865**. 1.037 8.164** 1.952 
D8 7.842** 0.851 11.537** 2.083 
D9 6.639** 0. 501 
D10 8.263** 1. 026 
D U 6.472** 0. 930 
D12 6.364** 0.980 
D13 5.810** 0. 873 8.182** 1.771 
D14 5.375** 1. 099 
D15 5.669** 1. 364 
D16 7.325** 0.977 
D17 6.352** 1 . 350 10.239** 2. Ill 
D18 3.790** 1. 123 
D19 4.049** 0. 999 
D20 6.476** 1.111 
D21 5.935** 1. 030 
D22 6.344** 0.94B 9.722** 1.840 
D23 5.693** 0. 870 9.151** 1.784 
D24 5.276** 0.89B 7.886** 1.835 
D25 6.552** 0.888 10.151** 1.832 
D26 6.748** 0.833 9.331** 1. 707 
D27 5.381** 0.805 8.578** 1. 636 
D28 6.063** 1.067 10.194** 2.227 
D29 6.200** 0.825 9.136** 1.750 
D30 6.796** 0. 830 9.800** 1.747 
D31 5.785** 0.883 9.013** 2.006 
D32 5.704** 0. 826 8.016** 1. 702 
D33 6.230** 0.814 10.599** 1.682 
D34 6.90S** 1. 315 
D35 6.783** 0.981 8.829** 2. 169 
D36 6.568** 0. 939 7.507** 2. 152 
D37 6.152** 0.818 9.184** 1. 649 
D38 6.674** 0.864 9.667** 1.807 
D39 5.577** 0.847 7.625** 1.818 
D40 5.718** 0.912 8.920** 2.072 
D41 5.889** 0.922 8.801** 2.018 
D42 5.849** 0. 833 9.245** 1.755 
D43 6.259** 0. 880 9.499** 1.916 
D44 6.022** 0. 863 10.138** 1. 802 
D45 8.988** 1.047 11.421** 2. 159 
D46 7.202** 1. 10B 
D47 8.406** 0. 959 
86 
E gnat ion 08 Eguati on 11 
Vari_abl_e coef f i_c i_ent ^tâQiâar d_er ror st andar d_i 
D48 5.438** 0. 806 7.764** 1.657 
D49 5.886** 1.344 9.055** 2.009 
D50 5.858** 0.896 11.235** 2.042 
D51 5.384** 1.011 7.668** 2. 149 
D52 7.744** 0.801 10.346** 1.646 
Ü53 5.280** 1. 036 
D54 6.940** 0.842 10.761** 1.816 
D55 6.363** 0.881 8.650** 2.014 
D56 5.422** 0.808 8.969** 1. 600 
D57 4.854** 0. 922 8.776** 1.928 
D58 4.900** 1. 147 
D59 6.168** 1 . 083 8.806** 1.941 
D60 7.948** 1.322 
D61 5.452** 0. 838 8.671** 1.698 
D62 4.553** 0. 864 7.554** 1.714 
Dó3 4.947** 1 . 005 8.286** 2.097 
D64 5.667** 1. 080 9.890** 2. 178 
DÓ5 5.103** 1. 055 9.816** 1.952 
D66 3.581** 1. 215 7.508** 2. 106 
D67 5.210** 0.841 8.559** 1. 673 
D68 6.951** 0. 784 9.063** 1.617 
D69 6.097** 0.946 
D70 6.300** 0. 839 8.157** 1.673 
D71 6.296** 0.869 8.806** 2. 191 
D72 5.704** 1. 688 12.736** 3.541 
D73 5.388** 1. 042 
D74 5.472** 1.659 
D75 5.434** 1 . 068 9.222** 2. 137 
D76 8.004** 1.244 
D77 8.219** 0.836 11.634** 1.703 
D78 7.158** 1. 209 
D79 4.970** 0.944 8.737** 1.764 
D80 4.688** 0. 880 8.140** 1.779 
D81 6.995** 1.363 10.317** 2. 165 
D82 5.584** 0. 857 8.018** 1.789 
D83 5.848** 0.845 9.374** 1.699 
D84 5.074** 0. 949 8.188** 1.871 
D85 5.927** 0.951 11.014** 1.901 
D86 5.654** 1. 127 
D87 5.133** 0.893 9.087** 1.757 
D88 4.718** 0.993 8.266** 1 953 
D89 5.311** 1.213 
D90 4.560** 0. 934 8.134** 1.942 
D91 4.095** 1. 028 8.790** 2. 164 
D92 5.106** 0. 885 9.096** 1.799 
D93 6.809** 0.848 10.459** 1.751 
D94 6.602** 0.795 9.027** 1.652 
D95 5.978** 0. 822 9.701** 1.656 
D96 4.762** 0.936 8.816** 2. 115 
D97 5.848** 0.978 
D98 7.001** 0.979 
D99 6.140** 0.870 8.373** 1.930 
87 
Eguati on 08 Eguation 11 
Variable coefficient standard_error coefficient standard^ 
D100 5.498** 0.802 8.458** 1.630 
D101 7.840** 0.750 7.355** 1. 614 
D102 6.152** 0. 880 8.255** 1. 831 
D103 6.258** 1.081 9.424** 1. 909 
D104 7.928** 1.051 11.375** 1.845 
D105 4.945** 1 . 213 7.895** 2.043 
D106 10.705** 1. 058 14.655** 2.014 
D107 7.694** 1 .217 
D108 8.370** 0. 870 12.474** 2.070 
D109 6.418** 0.874 8.746** 1.864 
D U O 7.672** 0. 857 11.070** 1.697 
Dill 8.618** 1. 002 14.046** 2.003 
D112 8.078** 0. 875 11.442** 1.782 
D113 7.266** 1.017 12.651** 1.952 
D114 9.536** 0. 896 12.708** 1.829 
D U 5 6.555** 0.870 9.057** 1. 724 
D116 4.100** 1. 086 7.113** 1.953 
D117 9.272** 0. 853 13.254** 1. 705 
D U B 5.276** 1. 542 
D119 3.331** 1. 338 7.903** 2. 163 
D120 8.282** 0. 888 11.233** 2.074 
D121 4.846** 1.085 8.605** 1. 950 
D122 4.783** 0.929 8.409** 1.745 
D123 5.447** 1. 357 
D124 5.960** 1. 086 7.231** 2.031 
D125 7.517** 1 . 081 11.990** 2.307 
D126 4.917** 1. 050 
D127 4.599** 1. 008 7.551** 1. 830 
D128 5.918** 0.978 8.962** 2.010 
D129 6.212** 0.912 ' 8.052** 1.991 
D130 5.908** 0.980 10.432** 2.071 
D131 8.039** 1.081 
D132 6.329** 1. 176 
D133 5.741** 1.228 
D134 6.804** 1.249 
D135 6.225** 1.290 9.309** 2.379 
D136 6.392** 1. 156 
D137 5.751** 1. 156 
D138 6.651** 1.085 10.313** 2. 167 
D139 6.691** 0.816 9.078** 1.704 
Note: All coefficients are statistically significant at the .01 
level of confidence. 
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Table D-7 
Estimated Regression Coefficients of the Industry Dummy Terms 
in Equations 09 and 12 
§9kl®tign_09 Eguat_ign__l 2 
Variable coefficient. st andard_error coefficient standard_error 
D1 36.317** 9.961 34.037** 11.512 
D2 9.820* 4. 980 16.721 15.850 
D3 35.157 58.090 
D4 22.081** 3.953 24.764** 6. 233 
D5 2. 568 4. 878 7.439 10.953 
D6 14.338 8.079 22.046* 11.107 
D7 2.121 6.014 20.380 10.807 
D8 -0.884 6. 868 
D9 -1.423 8. 583 
D10 0. 688 7. 100 
D U -10.560 5. 737 
D12 -11.430 8.371 
Dl 3 -5.848 5. 397 2. 641 10.878 
D14 -17.795 13.866 
D15 16.361 17.714 
D16 13.758 7.224 
D17 28.445** 7.035 29.804** 7. 121 
D18 24.047* 11.523 
D19 -0.203 10.590 
D20 4. 794 14.018 
D21 16.869 13.35B 
D22 -4.591 4.987 -4.147 6.076 
D23 3.928 5.456 68.237** 20.243 
D24 4.887 6. 230 12.512 11.335 
D25 14.409** 4.604 15.530 14.697 
D26 0.682 4.251 8. 810 8. 458 
D27 2.635 2.691 -3.581 5.229 
D28 5. 083 11.254 
D29 9.539* 3. 933 14.641 8. 256 
D30 1. 190 3. 865 23.815* 10.021 
D31 -1.508 7. 553 -29.933 22.891 
D32 -4.299 3.212 1.661 7.935 
D33 0.458 2. 697 3. 485 5.240 
D34 2.406 10.731 
D35 -2.344 6. 159 
D36 -4.892 5. 989 
D37 2.442 2. 876 10.138 7. 487 
D38 -2.400 4. 508 17.903 33.357 
D39 1.684 5. 753 88.224* 38.142 
D40 3.750 4. 941 34.835 20.962 
D41 -5.619 5. 505 2. 539 26.804 
D42 2. 190 3. 286 13.621* 5. 506 
D43 10.087* 4. 126 33.731** 12.626 
D44 -7.002 4. 225 -0.045 9.758 
D45 9.573 6> i 1 £ 
D46 -12.047 9. 158 
D47 -5.443 3. 770 
89 
Eguat i_OQ_0? Eguat i_on_12 
Variable coefficient standard _err.gr coefficient st andar d_err or 
D48 -2.891 2.349 6.819 7. 466 
D49 -37.938 75.B87 -35.168 74.960 
D50 11.407 6. 478 
D51 -13.006 7.689 
D52 6.075* 3. 022 6. 660 7.574 
D53 -28.267 24.893 
D54 15.067** 4. 152 34.001** 10.013 
D55 9. 172 9. 410 
D56 10.599** 3.282 8.236 4. 345 
D57 10.807 11.170 1. 783 49.014 
D58 2. 426 14.467 
D59 -17.715 14.426 -20.018 50.687 
D60 30.961* 14.955 
D61 9.454** 3.595 32.609** 6. 553 
D62 2. 431 3.215 6.982 4. 130 
D63 -7.616 13.561 
D64 -4.074 6. 977 16.075 121.027 
D65 14.454 12.840 12.348 22.225 
D66 19.470 16.788 
D67 6. 570 4.691 5. 300 7.442 
D68 6.389* 3.013 17.786** 6.057 
D69 -5.766 5. 208 
D70 1.297 4. 170 10.547 12.679 
D71 16.867** 2.899 
D72 -10.515 8.044 -11.028 9. 225 
D73 36.512** 11.940 
D74 15.307 9.970 
D75 5.886 5.887 
D76 9.207 19.040 
D77 9.418** 2.569 15.837** 4.653 
D78 22.136* 10.556 
D79 0.999 5.422 -7.584 6. 895 
D80 -0.571 5.911 4. 355 12.543 
D81 7.838 4. 384 
D82 11.138** 4.291 17.858 11.382 
D83 -3.369 3. 145 0. 861 5.935 
D84 7. 115 4.659 10.585 7. 292 
D85 7.056 3. 988 4. 315 5. 222 
D86 7.506 11.613 
D87 -1.285 5.925 2. 268 7.424 
D88 -1.620 6.994 -1.274 14.417 
D89 -2.859 19.742 
D90 4.459 9.564 -53.602 48.408 
D91 -12.723 8. 208 
D92 0.829 5.877 -5.886 19.280 
D93 18.844** 3.999 12.572 8.617 
D94 5.938** 1.941 15.390* 6.525 
D95 9.643* 4.033 10.926 6. 833 
D96 -21.887 12.225 
D97 -6.342 8.277 
D98 3. 008 9.726 
D99 0. 141 5.467 -0.658 44.632 
90 
Vari §bl_e Ç.2ËÎ.Î. L£i§zQÌ=. standar d_i 
D100 2. 959 O 979 
D101 15.275** 1. 553 
D102 22.200** 5. 275 
D103 -6.806 16. 023 
D104 9.096 10. 178 
D105 -1.182 11. 780 
D106 7.215 15. 173 
D107 7.966 8. 423 
D108 12.226** 2. 315 
D109 12.156** 4. 167 
D U O 17.678** 4. 556 
Dill 5.379 6. 791 
D112 11.804* ' 5. 532 
D113 18.535** 4. 495 
D114 22.319** 4. 890 
D115 -1.969 6. 418 
D116 0.452 14. 362 
D117 5.454 4. 186 
D118 27.114* 12. 406 
D119 47.166 50. 466 
D120 10.748* 5. 483 
D121 10.870 10. 305 
D122 17.677** 4. 378 
D123 -16.296 68. 749 
D124 3.941 7. 668 
D125 7. 136 3. 827 
D126 -14.292 10. 426 
D127 6. 125 9. 694 
D128 -5.051 9. 413 
D129 -13.178 7. 873 
D130 -7.759 8. 259 
D131 9.711 6. 598 
D132 -33.718* 13. 327 
D133 39.077* 19. 104 
D134 -4.188 30. 459 
D135 -23.749 24. 560 
D136 0.574 12. 328 
D137 -9.609 9. 802 
D13S 11.675 43. 257 
D139 12.555** 2. 286 
error 
Eguat i_on_i2 
coefficient standard error 
- 0 . 2 1 2 
3. 040 
-9.761 










































Note: (*) indicates significance at the .05 level of confidence 
and (**) at the .01 level. 
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Table D-7 
Estimated Regression Coefficients of the Industry-Domestic Sales 




































































-0.581 0. 622 



























































































1 . 2 8 1 
0. 451 




. , standard coefficient error 
Eguat i_on_f2 


















































































































































,,. . . standard coefficient error 
Eguat ign _ 1.2 















































































































































1nDS*D101 •1. 233** 0.086 -0. 656 0. 415 
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Vari.abl_e i9U§ti_on_0? 
,-. . standard coef f1 cient error 
Eguat i_on 






















































































1nDS*D121 -1.122 0. 577 -0. 927 0. 690 
1nDS*Dl22 -1.530** 0. 248 -0. 929** 0. 356 
1nDS*Dl23 -0.220 3. 171 
1nDS*Dl24 -0.673 0. 434 
TOBACCO 
lnDS*D125 -0.768** 0. 203 -0. 897** 0. 245 
PRINTING 
1nDS*Dl26 0.202 0. 532 
1nDS*D127 -0.868 0. 521 —2 « 285* 0. 944 
OTHER MANUFACTURES 
1nDS*D128 -0.177 0. 519 1. 049 1. 219 
1nDS*D129 0. 302 0. 440 —2. 473 4. 283 
lnDS*D130 -0.028 0. 458 
1nDS*D131 -0.886* 0. 422 
1nDS*Dl32 1.369 0. 716 
1nDS*D133 -2.707* 1. 099 
lnDS*D134 -0.186 1 .659 
1nDS*Dl35 0. 703 1.217 
1nDS*Dl36 -0.461 0. 683 
1nDS*D137 0. 034 0. 520 
1nDS*Dl38 -1.067 2. 429 
lnDS*D139 -1.117** 0. 123 0. 180 0. 745 
Note: <*> indicates significance at the 
and <**) at the .01 level. 
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